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**FROM THE EDITORIAL
BOARD**

Allow me to congratulate the lead editor of this issue, Eitan Tzelgov, for pulling together a terrific set of articles by excellent authors. Eitan was a postdoc at the V-Dem Institute who did a tremendous amount of service to the project for two and a half years, and has just joined the faculty at University of East Anglia. We will miss him a lot, even if he will continue to be involved in V-Dem as an associate researcher.

The current issue will be followed by one on democratization and n

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OPPOSITION COORDINATION IN AFRICA

Michael Wahman, *University of Missouri*



Authoritarian incumbents, in autocracies with and without elections, have often used ‘divide and rule’ as a strategy to mitigate the threat from internal opposition. Theoretically, the move from closed authoritarianism to electoral authoritarianism should have required authoritarian rulers to extend their winning coalitions and make a strong appeal beyond their core group of supporters. Nevertheless, after the broad African reintroduction of multipartyism in the early 1990s many authoritarian leaders were able to maintain power without extending their winning coalitions due to significant fractionalization among opposition challengers. One such example is Kenya. Amid a fractionalized opposition, incumbent president Daniel Arap Moi was able to win both the 1992 and 1997 elections despite never securing more than 40 percent of the presidential vote. Even more astonishing, Moi’s KANU party managed to keep hold of an outright majority in parliament despite only winning 30 percent and 38 percent in the 1992 and 1997 parliamentary elections respectively. Kenya saw its first electoral turnover in 2002, when Moi’s successor, Uhuru Kenyatta lost to opposition challenger Mwai Kibaki. Unlike 1992 and 1997, the 2002 general election featured a unified opposition. It has been widely acknowledged that the unification of the opposition was one of the key explanations to the long awaited KANU defeat.

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**DESTINED FOR DEFEAT? WHY PEOPLE RUN FOR THE
OPPOSITION IN ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES**

Keith Weghorst, *Vanderbilt University*



About 30 percent of countries in the world are electoral authoritarian regimes.¹ There is a growing literature on electoral authoritarianism but there remains significant ground to be covered in this research program.

First, little research on electoral authoritarianism focuses on Africa. Yet, the majority of electoral authoritarian regimes are found in sub-Saharan Africa. Over half of the countries there have this form of government. Second, explanations of opposition behavior are frequently endogenous to the goals of the ruling elite. Few scholars explicitly theorize about opposition actors. Third, studies of elections in authoritarian settings commonly focus on voting behavior and interparty competition without sufficient attention to candidates, the individuals actually competing against one another in elections.

My dissertation, completed in 2015, studies the opposition in electoral authoritarian regimes. Specifically, I ask *why do individuals run for office on opposition tickets, given those*

1. Based Michael K’s Miller’s classification in Michael K. Miller, “Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development” *Comparative Political Studies* 49 (May 2015): 1526-52.

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THE DISTURBING NORMALITY OF PROTEST UNDER AUTHORITARIANISM

Andreas Schedler, *CIDE, Mexico City*



Which is the role of peaceful mass protest in the generation of authoritarian regime crises?¹ Comparative scholars tend to concord that the “predominant political conflict in dictatorships” does not unfold between rulers and masses, but “among regime insiders.”² The primary threats to the political survival of authoritarian rulers are “horizontal”; they arise from within the ruling coalition. “Vertical” challenges from below in the form of mass protests by ordinary citizens rarely succeed in toppling dictators.

Normal Protest

Students of comparative authoritarianism also tend to agree on *the exceptional nature* of anti-authoritarian mass demonstrations. While the competition among elite factions” is endemic under dictatorship, street protests against authoritarian rule are supposed to be rare occurrences. Authoritarian regimes strive to either preempt or repress them and are usually successful in doing so. In equilibrium, they generate popular quiescence. Due to repression, contentment, uncertainty about the preferences of others, or problems of collective action, most of the time most citizens comply with the behavioral demands of the regime.³

1. This essay contains fragments from the forthcoming (homonymous) book chapter “The Disturbing Normality of Protest under Authoritarianism,” in Johannes Gerschewski, Wolfgang Merkel, and Christoph Stefes, eds., *Crises in Autocracies* (in preparation). In addition to further methodological detail, theoretical reflection, and data analysis, the book chapter (available in a preliminary version from the author at request) contains comparative data on democracies as well as information on repressive responses by governments. I thank Max Bader, Jason Brownlee, Martin Dimitrov, Zachary Elkins, Svein-Erik Helle, Wendy Hunter, Kurt Weyland as well as the editors of the prospective volume for their valuable comments on earlier (extensive) versions of this piece.

2. Milan W. Svobik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 5 (emphasis removed).

3. See e.g. Xi Chen, *Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2004); and Elizabeth A. Stein, “Mainstream Newspaper Coverage: A Barometer of Government Tolerance for Anti-Regime Expression in Authoritarian Brazil,” Research Paper no. 31 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2007), available at shoresteincenter.org.

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HOW OPPOSITION COOPTATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AFFECT STATE REPRESSION IN AUTOCRACIES

Courtenay R. Conrad, *University of California, Merced*

Ae Sil Woo, *University of California, Merced*



Although democratic institutions are generally associated with improved respect for human rights, dictators that sanction the creation of political opposition parties and institutionalized legislatures often engage in more repression than their less “democratic” counterparts. What can be done to limit repression associated with the creation of “democratic” institutions in autocracies? In this article, we argue that although dictatorial legislatures and opposition parties are associated with increases in targeted government repression, the effect of such cooptative institutionalization is likely dependent on environmental context. More specifically, we seek to determine whether the positive and significant effect of opposition cooptation on government repression goes away in dictatorships that allow freedom of the press or effective courts.¹

In the next section, we review existing literature on the effect of autocratic cooptation on state repression in autocracies. We then present a theory arguing that the positive effect of political parties and institutionalized legislatures on autocratic repression against the opposition is mitigated when leaders face constraints on repression—specifically, when they must

1. We define repression as “the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions.” This definition comes from Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 10 (June 2007): 1-23. We use the term human rights violations interchangeably with state repression. We define cooptation as the “intentional extension of benefits to potential challengers to the regime in exchange for their loyalty.” This definition comes from Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “A Dictator’s Toolkit: Understanding How Cooptation Affects Repression in Autocracies,” *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (March 2014): 332-346.

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TERRORISM AS A TACTIC IN DICTATORSHIPS

Deniz Aksoy, *Princeton University*



Since the attacks of 9/11 scholarly interest in understanding causes and consequences of terrorism has greatly increased. An important theme in this burgeoning literature is the relationship between regime type and terrorism with a focus on the differences in patterns of terrorism across democracies and non-democracies. In this essay, I first provide an overview of the debate on regime type and terrorism in the political violence literature. Second, I highlight the importance of moving away from a dichotomous classification of regime type and unpacking democracies and non-democracies. To date, much more work has been done on unpacking democracies relative to dictatorships. Accordingly, I emphasize recent literature that illustrates how institutional variation within non-democracies affects the emergence of terrorist groups within these regimes. In the rest of the essay, I point out ways in which future work on terrorism in dictatorships can be improved.

Regime type and terrorism

Long list of scholars have shown that democracies experience more terrorism than non-democracies. This finding holds when we focus on different aspects of terrorism, such as the frequency of terrorist attacks, lethality of attacks, emergence of terrorist groups, as well as number of terrorist groups operating in a country.¹ Since democracies give regime opponents and discontented

1. See for instance William Lee Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13 (March 2001): 155–64; Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, "Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible Commitments," *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (June 2011): 357–378; and

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FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD, CONTINUED

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conflict, and then we are looking forward to issues on democracy support, as well as on linguistic-ethnic divides and democracy. As always, I welcome suggestions from members on topics to be covered in the future!

Staffan I. Lindberg, Executive Editor

This issue is devoted to opposition in authoritarian regimes. Most studies of authoritarian political systems examine their inner workings, or the ways regime insiders use resources to limit activities threatening their hegemony. The authors here focus explicitly on opposition to these regimes and offer new insights, as well as venues for further research in the study of authoritarian opposition.

The first three authors examine facets of opposition activity. Michael Wahman discusses factors undermining the cohesion of opposition parties in Africa both at the voter and the elite levels. The author calls for better fusion of work on opposition parties' coordination (which, in the context of authoritarian politics, has mainly been studied through the lens of the political economy of the regime), and on opposition voters' coordination (such as studies of strategic voting).

Keith Weghorst's essay asks why individuals choose to run against regime candidates, knowing their chances of winning are slim. Challenging established theories, which focus on material benefits and regime co-optation as the driving factors, the author argues that better answers can be found by studying opposition candidates themselves, emphasizing parameters that vary between opposition and ruling parties' candidates, as well as among opposition candidates themselves.

In another piece that highlights agency of regime opponents, Andreas Schedler provides a provocative argument regarding what he terms the disturbing normality of protest in authoritarian regimes. Contrary to previous studies, Schedler's piece presents evidence that mass protests in authoritarianism are frequent, well attended, and often highly critical of the regime.

The two remaining pieces focus more explicitly the contentious relationship between regime and opposition. While previous work showed that when these regimes have legalized parties, they exhibit higher levels of targeted human rights violations, Courtenay Conrad and Ae-Sil Woo hypothesize that institutions increasing the cost of repression should limit its use. The

empirics indicate that a more free media is related to reduced levels of repression, but an effective judiciary is found to be unrelated. These preliminary results contribute to the debate on the role of democratically oriented institutions and the limits of power-use in authoritarianism.

In the final piece Deniz Aksoy argues that in order to explain the emergence of terrorist groups in authoritarian polities, scholars should stop treating authoritarian systems as a single category, and instead study the relationship between different authoritarian institutions and terrorism. The author also points to promising directions for further research, such as studying the consequences of terrorism in autocracies.

Overall, these works demonstrate the benefits of focusing on the opposition forces in authoritarianism. While they are able to limit the set of options available to the opposition, regime insiders are not omnipotent. Thus, studying opposition actors directly can shed light on the constant power struggles in these regimes, on the strategy of regime opponents, and provide a better understanding of regimes' stability and collapse.

Eitan Tzelgov, Issue Editor

WAHMAN, CONTINUED

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Table 1. SF-ratio in presidential elections in Africa

| Election No | Average opposition SF-ratio | Number of Elections |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| 1 | .4509959 | 25 |
| 2 | .3724596 | 26 |
| 3 | .3550526 | 22 |
| 4 or higher | .3073492 | 16 |
| | Average opposition SF-ratio | Number of Elections |
| Electoral Autocracies | .3813 | 68 |
| Democracies | .3696 | 21 |
| One Round | .40977 | 28 |
| Two Round | .3616 | 61 |
| Total | .3785 | 89 |

With the rapid global spread of the electoral authoritarian regime-type, many scholars have questioned how and if authoritarian elections contribute to democratization, authoritarian stability or authoritarian legitimization. As conflicting results have suggested that elections in multiparty autocracies might have had diverse effects on democratization in varying environments, some researchers have turned to a more conditional understanding of the relationship between elections and democratization. In this understanding, the central question is not *if*, but *under what circumstances*, elections in electoral autocracies lead to democratization. In this literature, opposition strategy in general and opposition coordination in particular has been attributed great importance. In a global study of elections and democratization, Howard and Roessler (2006) identified opposition coordination as the most powerful predictor of “liberalizing electoral outcomes.” Others have questioned the causal impact of opposition coordination, arguing that the relationship between opposition victories and opposition coordination is endogenous or argued that opposition coordination does not improve democratization in the long run.¹

1. Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, *Defeating*

This essay will put specific emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa, the continent with the highest number of electoral autocracies in the world and a context where opposition fragmentation has remained an important obstacle for political competition. I will argue that before understanding the way in which opposition cohesion affects electoral outcomes or, indeed, democratization, we need a better understanding of the dynamics underlying opposition cohesion in electoral autocracies and new democracies. The field has progressed in this respect, but is still scattered. This essay will summarize two separate sets of literature with relevance for opposition coordination: research on *Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Daniela Donno, “Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes,” *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (July 2013): 703-16; Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,” *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (November 2007): 1279-1301; Marc Morjé Howard, and Philip Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes,” *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (April 2006): 365-381; Staffan Lindberg, *Democracy and Elections in Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Danielle Resnick, “Do Electoral Coalitions Facilitate Democratic Consolidation in Africa,” *Party Politics* 19 (September 2013): 735-57; Milan Svoblik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Michael Wahman, “Opposition Coalitions and Democratization by Elections,” *Government and Opposition* 48 (January 2013): 3-32.

voter coordination and the literature on *elite coordination*. Surprisingly, there has been very little fusion between these two literatures within the study of comparative democratization. Coordination (or the lack of coordination) could derive from both the willingness of elites to coordinate before elections and from voters’ ability to vote strategically. The literature on elite coordination has most prominently promoted explanations related to the political economy of authoritarianism, whereas the literature on strategic voting has been preoccupied with the importance of electoral institutions and social cleavages (and the interaction between these two). Moreover, both these sets of literature have a spatial element in seeking to understand the coordination of opposition parties both within and between electoral and geographical units. I will argue that future research on opposition coordination would benefit from consolidating the literatures on voter coordination and elite coordination and hypothesize how these two sources of opposition coordination interact within and between sub-national electoral units.

Opposition Coordination in Africa

Cox (1997) introduced the “Second to

First loser ratio" (SF-ratio) to measure electoral fragmentation. A low SF-ratio would indicate that elites and/or voters have coordinated around the strongest challenger (i.e. the second loser is much smaller than the first loser), whereas a high SF-ratio shows considerable fragmentation (i.e. the second loser is almost as big as the first loser). Looking at this standard measure of fragmentation, what can we say about opposition coordination in Africa? Table 1 introduces the SF ratio for opposition candidates (i.e. the ratio between the second and first opposition candidate's vote share) participating in African presidential elections (based on results from the first round of voting). Data are from the Bogaards (2013) dataset, an update of Lindberg's (2009) original data. The table shows both the average across all elections in the period 1990-2010 and averages for each uninterrupted election cycle of a country's history of multipartyism.²

First, the table shows that on average among the 89 presidential elections in my sample the second opposition candidate got 38 percent of the votes received by the top opposition candidate. This, indeed, shows a substantial amount of opposition fragmentation in African presidential elections. However, there is an interesting decreasing trend, implying that over time African opposition parties have become more coordinated. Whereas the average opposition SF-ratio was as high as .45 in the first multiparty election, it was down to .31 after three uninterrupted

2. In the table I have excluded countries that were coded as "military multiparty" in the Wahman et al (2013) dataset. See Matthijs Bogaards, "Exchange: Reexamining African Elections," *Journal of Democracy* 24 (October 2013): 151-160; Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Staffan Lindberg (ed.), *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); Michael Wahman, Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius, "Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in a Comparative Perspective," *Contemporary Politics* 19 (January 2013): 19-34.

multiparty elections had been conducted, showing a gradual increase in voter coordination over time. These averages may manifest the importance of information, a factor stressed in earlier research.³ As opposition parties and voters gain electoral experience they are more likely to update and adapt their electoral strategies. As electoral experience increase voters can more accurately predict the winner and candidates have more realistic expectations about their chances of winning elections when going it alone.

Table 1 also shows opposition SF-ratios in the first round of elections based on whether a country was classified as an electoral autocracy or a democracy (according to the classification by Wahman et al. 2013) and whether the electoral rules permitted a second round of voting if the first round was indecisive. Surprisingly, there is only a marginal difference in SF ratios between democracies and electoral autocracies. Also, the finding that two-round elections have more coordination than one-round elections is surprising. We would expect that the possibility of a run-off election would encourage opposition candidates to go-it-alone in the first round and coordinate in the second round. However, the perhaps most notable case of African opposition coordination is Ghana where the opposition has consistently shown high levels of coordination despite the fact that both the 2004 and 2008 contest resulted in a run-off. These results are in line with the state of the literature that has shown a weak relationship between electoral system design and electoral

3. Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz, "Information and Ethnic Politics in Africa," *British Journal of Political Science* 43 (April 2013): 345-73; Jennifer Gandhi and Ora John Reuter, "The Incentives for Pre-electoral Coalitions in Non-democratic Elections," *Electoral Studies* 20 (January 2013): 137-59; Michael Wahman, "Electoral Coordination in Anglophone Africa," *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 52 (April 2014): 187-211.

outcomes in electoral autocracies.⁴

Voter Coordination

When discussing opposition coordination in Africa, surprisingly little energy has been devoted to understanding the incentives and actions of voters and their ability to forge coordination through strategic voting. The most ambitious contribution to our understanding of opposition coordination in Africa to date is Leonardo Arriola's *Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa* (2013). This book sets a new standard for the study of opposition coordination in Africa and beyond. However, a weakness in Arriola's argument is that it does not emphasize or theorize the importance of voters in the rational calculation of coalition making. Consistent with the long-dominant ethnic voting thesis in African politics, ethnic groups are seen as stackable building blocks used to manufacture popular majorities. It is argued that voters generally follow their ethnic figureheads. If leaders decide to go-it-alone, constituencies will stay loyal; when leaders decide to create coalitions, voters will follow regardless of the nature of that coalition. However, the ethnic voting thesis is put under increasing pressure in the study of African politics. Numerous studies have indicated that ethnicity is but one of many determinants of African vote choice and that class, performance evaluation, and urban/rural divides also matter for the choice of voters. Theoretically, if elections are not merely ethnic censuses, voters may coordinate through strategic voting in a way that approximates voters in established Western democracies. Such coordination might appear both within

4. Jennifer Gandhi and Ora John Reuter, (2013); Harris Mylonas and Nasnos Roussias, "When Do Votes Count? Regime Type, Electoral Conduct, and Political Competition in Africa," *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (November 2008): 1466-91; Michael Wahman, "Offices and Policies—Why do Opposition Parties Form Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes?" *Electoral Studies* 30 (December 2011): 624-57.

Wahman

and between districts.

Voter coordination within districts

The clearest incentives for voters to coordinate within districts would appear under the type of parliamentary disproportionate election rules frequently used in Anglophone Africa. Although some research has studied party fragmentation nationally, little is known about how parties coordinate on the constituency level. A strict interpretation of Duverger's (1954) psychological effect (i.e. the theory that voters would desert unviable candidates not to waste their votes) can, however, only be tested at the constituency level. Looking particularly at constituency level election results in single member district (SMD) elections in five African countries over time, Wahman (2014) shows that constituency level election results converged to Duvergerian expectations in Botswana and Ghana, but not in Kenya, Malawi, and, Zambia. Outside the African context, Burttoff (2015) argued that tribal dynamics in Jordan reduced opposition coordination despite disproportional electoral rules. The lack of within-district coordination in several disproportionate electoral systems across Africa is puzzling given Conroy-Krutz's (2013) experimental evidence from Uganda suggesting that voters do indeed favor popular candidates over unpopular candidates. However, a minimal level of information is needed for voters to vote strategically. In the absence of reliable polling, earlier election results would be a good indication as to which voters could base their expectations. Indeed, Table 1 showed a gradual increase in voter coordination over time. However, due to high party volatility in many African countries earlier election results are often not good indicators of contemporary party strength.⁵

5. Gail Burttoff, "Coordination Failure and the Politics of Tribes: Jordanian Elections under SNTV," *Electoral Studies* 40 (December 2015):

Voter coordination between districts

A question that has received very little attention is to what extent voters are prepared to desert locally popular candidates in favor of more nationally viable alternatives. Indeed, there are several examples of presidential contenders that arrived overwhelming support in their home areas without having a realistic chance in the general election. One recent example is Atupele Muluzi, the presidential candidate for the United Democratic Front (UDF) in the 2014 Malawi election. As predicted by opinion polls published before the election Muluzi finished fourth in the elections nationally. However, he crushed all opponents in the predominantly Muslim Eastern region (Machinga and Mangochi districts) by securing 58 percent of the vote, compared to only 18 percent for his closest opponent. On the other hand, there is also some evidence suggesting that voters in some cases refuse to bloc vote for nationally unviable candidates. In a recent paper by Brass and Cheeseman (2013) a specific focus is put on the electoral misfortunes of Musalia Mudavadi, the presidential contender for the Amani Coalition in Kenya's 2013 election.⁶ In an election generally seen as a two-horse race, Mudavadi was only able to finish second in his home region of Western Kenya. Beyond the presidential race, presidential coattail theories also hypothesize that voters may desert locally viable but nationally marginal parties in favor of parties

45-55; Conroy-Krutz (2013); Staffan Lindberg, "Consequences of Electoral Systems in Africa: A Preliminary Inquiry," *Electoral Studies* 24 (March 2005): 41-64; Shaheen Mozaffar, James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich, "Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 97 (August 2003): 379-390; Wahman (2014).

6. Jennifer N. Brass and Nic Cheeseman, "Beyond Ethnic Politics: The Limits of Bloc-Voting in Kenya," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association (ASA), Baltimore, 21-24 November 2013.

with the strength to create a national parliamentary majority for their favored presidential candidate. Much more research is needed to understand the limits of local bloc-voting and to uncover under what circumstances voters' demand for local candidates are low despite elites' willingness to supply such alternatives.

Elite Coordination

Elite coordination in new democracies and electoral autocracies is still poorly understood. This is hardly surprising given that our understanding of this topic is limited even in consolidated democracies. Most research on coalition formation has been concerned with post-electoral rather than pre-electoral bargaining. Amid interest in the relationship between opposition coordination and democratization some recent work has, however, studied elite incentives and prospects for elite coordination. Some of the work has been cross-regional, whereas a substantial part of the literature has focused specifically on Africa.⁷

Although the general arguments from previous studies have diverged, one conclusion seems to hold across studies: political institutions, such as election system design and presidentialism, seem to have had limited importance for the prospects of elite coordination under electoral autocracy. Instead, authors have been looking elsewhere to explain variations in coordination across cases and time. Arriola (2013) develops a "pecuniary theory" of coalition formation, stressing the

7. See Leonardo Arriola, *Multi-Ethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Matthijs Bogaards, "Electoral Alliances in Africa: What Do We know, What Can We Do?" *Journal of African Elections* 13 (June 2014): 25-42; Gandhi and Reuter (2013); Dennis Kadima, ed., *The Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa* (Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and EISA, 206); Wahman (2011).

importance of political economy and access to private capital. In Arriola's theory, the main obstacle to coordination is credible commitment. Put simply, rivaling opposition candidates cannot be sure that potential coalition partners will ultimately honor coalition deals. However, if coalition formateurs are able to offer financial benefits up front, junior partners face lower risks when accepting coalition deals. In countries where opposition parties have access to private capital, coalition formateurs are more likely to have the resources necessary to "buy" the support of fellow opposition challengers. Similarly, Wahman (2011) also stresses the problem of credible commitment, arguing that dominant incumbent parties are often able to coopt opposition parties when opposition challengers do not see realistic chances of ousting the incumbent regime or in situations where the incumbent and the challengers are not distinguishable in terms of policy platforms.⁸

Elite coordination within districts

The classic perception of African politics, identifying ethnicity as the dominant political cleavage, is currently losing popularity. Ethnicity may have been exaggerated as a determinant of vote choice nationally. Even more importantly, looking at local electoral dynamics we see that competition is often intra- rather than inter-ethnic. Political constituencies, especially those with a relatively high level of ethnic homogeneity often feature significant intra-ethnic competition. Quite often party discipline is low and disgruntled primary election losers compete in elections on independent tickets. One example is the 2014 Malawian parliamentary election where a total of 420 independent candidates competed in the country's 193 constituencies. Most of these candidates had previously contested party primaries.

8. Ibid.

More research is needed in order to understand such dynamics. When do opposition parties effectively control their home areas by consolidating and safeguarding their political base from local defection and when do they divide due to internal differences and political opportunism?

Elite coordination between districts

The most important obstacle to opposition coordination in Africa is low party nationalization. Wahman (forthcoming) showed that party nationalization in Africa is significantly lower than in Latin America and that there is an important difference in the level of nationalization between incumbent and opposition parties on the African continent. Not only are opposition parties generally less nationalized than their incumbent counterparts, opposition parties are also more likely to exhibit low nationalization under adverse conditions such as low levels of urbanization, large territorial size and, most importantly, ethnic heterogeneity. Incumbent parties manage to keep nationalized despite these adverse conditions. Using state resources incumbent parties are able to build nationwide organizations and multi-ethnic coalitions, whereas opposition parties have often concentrated their electoral efforts to particular geographical areas. Danielle Resnick (2014) argues that opposition parties have often made a dual appeal, concentrating campaigns to urban areas (where campaigning is cheap) and areas where they can claim some sort of ethnic linkage. The resulting consequence is low opposition elite coordination across space.⁹

Conclusion

The literature on opposition

9. Danielle Resnick, *Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Michael Wahman, "Nationalized Incumbents and Region Challengers: Opposition- and Incumbent-Party Nationalization in Africa," *Party Politics* 22 (forthcoming).

coordination in Africa is still scattered. More research is needed to uncover the relationship between voter and elite coordination. We also need better knowledge on how coordination differs between and within electoral units. There is a clear relationship between voter and elite behavior. A strategy of opposition fragmentation along regional lines is dependent on voters' persistent loyalty and the absence of strategic voting. Going-it-alone is an attractive strategy for regional leaders trying to build local platforms for subsequent bids or those creating vehicles for subsequent incumbent party co-optation. However, local elites are unlikely to supply non-nationalized alternatives if voters lack the demand for such nationally non-viable offerings. African party systems are diverse. The way in which parties and voters behave differs between African democracies, but also within countries. Some voter groups are more prone to bloc voting, others are more politically sophisticated. Future work on opposition coordination in Africa would benefit from a holistic view of African opposition parties, taking both voter and elite incentives into account. When doing so, researchers should pay tribute to the fact that African parties vary in mobilization strategies. Understanding the way in which opposition parties interact will remain key in advancing our knowledge on elections and democratization in electoral authoritarian regimes.

Michael Wahman is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri. The author would like to thank Emir Yazici for excellent research assistance.

WEGHORST, CONTINUED

(continued from page 1)

parties have little chance of victory? Based on three total years of fieldwork from 2009–2014, I develop an original theory of candidacy and test it in Tanzania, where the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has governed for over fifty years. I emphasize that early life experiences with partisan politics and civic activism impose a path dependence on party choice when the decision to run for office arises. The path of partisan versus civic activism into candidacy also impacts the benefits that candidates expect from office and their willingness to bear financial and non-material candidacy costs. Thus, when individuals engage in the strategic calculus of running for office, heterogeneity in perceived benefits and costs makes the opposition more appealing to certain kinds of candidates. This approach follows a minority of studies² that challenge the view of the political elite in authoritarian settings as uniformly seeking material goods and the spoils of clientelism.

The case of Tanzania is particularly compelling. It resembles other electoral authoritarian regimes on measures of government use of repression and violence.³ Further, it features a unique form of federalism offering within-case variation in opposition strength. Tanzania has a national government where CCM has dominated politics and a semi-autonomous President and legislature in Zanzibar where CCM faces a stronger opposition. In the October 2015 elections, the opposition in Zanzibar won enough votes to defeat CCM for the first time in history. While the partisan government annulled the elections, my study highlights decisions

2. Notably, Kenneth F. Greene, *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

3. Based on David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards. 2010. "The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project" *Human Rights Quarterly* 32 (May 2010): 401–424.

opposition actors make in the moments prior to defeating an authoritarian government.

Prevailing Explanation

Prevailing accounts of what motivates opposition participation in electoral authoritarian regimes emphasize the role of co-optation. In the context of legislative candidacy, opposition candidates run for office in order to be co-opted by the ruling elite—to win a plum spot in government or to extract resources. A popular opposition candidate can demonstrate his/her value to the ruling party and maximize what he/she extracts from it.⁴ The view that ruling party and opposition candidates are uniformly motivated by material gains is also echoed in literature on political elites in Africa's democracies.

In a co-optation approach, oppositions' motivations are generally derived from goals of the ruling party and what they offer: autocratic elites create power-sharing institutions to distribute spoils to challengers to keep them at bay. The validity of these assumptions needs further interrogation.

First, opposition voters have already stood against the government and may not support an opposition candidate who "sells out" to the ruling party. Second, there is little empirical evidence of the "transaction" of co-optation taking place. One might expect the ruling party to co-opt their most threatening challengers—opposition candidates popular enough to overcome electoral disadvantages and win legislative seats. This intuition is incorrect. Over half of electoral authoritarian regimes punish party-switching of elected legislators by forcing them to vacate their seat and re-run, substantially greater than advanced democracies (8 percent) and

4. See Jennifer Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar, "Elections Under Authoritarianism" *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (June 2009): 403–422.

recent democratizers (14 percent).⁵ The power of autocrats to co-opt is directly undermined by laws they establish that constrain co-optation.

Lastly, this approach does not permit heterogeneity in what candidates expect to get by holding office, comparative advantages parties have in appealing to candidates, and goals that can be reached without even winning.

New Theory

My theory of opposition candidacy has three main components. First, it turns the clock back on where most studies of candidacy begin—after individuals have already made the decision to run for office. The theory centers early partisan and civic activism before candidacy and how these experiences influence later candidacy decisions. The second component turns to intraparty politics of candidate nomination after an individual seeks out candidacy. To date, the literature has focused primarily on election prospects as a contest over voter support after nominations are completed. The third component explores what candidates gain from the outcomes of the nomination and election contests. I theorize that candidates are heterogeneous in the benefits they expect from office, whether those benefits can be obtained by losing nomination and election competitions, and willingness to bear financial and non-material campaign costs.

5. Figures based on Martin Goeke and Christof Hartmann, "The Regulation of Party-Switching in Africa," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 29 (August 2011): 263–280 and Kenneth Janda, "Laws against Party Switching, Defecting, or Floor-Crossing in National Parliaments," paper presented at the 2009 World Congress on the International Political Science Association, Santiago, Chile, 12–16 July 2009.

Component 1. Life trajectories of “Career Partisanship” versus Civic Activism

The choices individuals make regarding candidacy are set into motion years before they make a decision to run (or not). These life trajectories shape distinctive avenues into candidacy.

My research identifies two primary paths leading to candidacy ambitions, one to ruling party candidacy and the other to the opposition. The road to ruling party candidacy is partisan, starting in party-sponsored soccer clubs and Boy/Girl Scout-like programs and continuing later in positions in local and national party offices. Through this process, a ruling party grooms prospective candidates into party loyalists. In turn, these individuals derive political capital and supplementary income from association with the ruling party. Running with the opposition is not attractive to them because leadership and political reputation are inseparable from the ruling party.

Opposition candidacy emerges from a different trajectory. Opposition parties lack the financial resources and organizational capacity to recruit youth and groom them into loyal partisans to run as candidates. Instead, they draw from civic organizations and civil society. These groups are highly visible, have public credibility, and can offer administrative support, activist networks, and basic resources like offices, copiers, etc. Further, the priorities of civic activists often overlap with the opposition's stated goals like fighting corruption, deepening democratization, and protecting human rights. This alignment results in “social-electoral” coalitions where the opposition and civil society figures coalesce around election times.⁶ Thus, early experience

with activities like grassroots organization and membership in civil society organizations sets in place a path that leads to later candidacy with the opposition.

Component 2. Intraparty Competition

The only decision prospective candidates completely control is pursuing candidacy (or not) with a particular political party. Seeking to run does not ensure victory in an election or even whether an individual is nominated by a party to compete. As scholars, we argue that prospective candidates weigh their chances of winning office, but mostly interpret those odds as the competitiveness of an election.

Considering election prospects alone do not get us far in understanding opposition candidacy in settings where the deck is severely stacked in favor of the ruling party. Why then would any strategic, calculating individual choose to run for severely disadvantaged opposition parties? Focusing on internal party competition helps answer this question.

The prospects of winning an election are inversely related to nomination chances. In areas where their victory is a foregone conclusion, a ruling party has their pick over a large pool of highly qualified individuals to field as a candidate. In electoral authoritarian regimes, nominations contests are significantly more challenging for the ruling party than the opposition. This is not only in terms of the number of nomination competitors faced, but also the political and party-based qualifications of their challengers, and the centralization and exclusiveness of the nomination procedures used.⁷

Perspectives on Politics 12 (June 2014): 332-352.

Thus, even though ruling party election prospects are very promising, only a small subset of prospective candidates will ever make it onto a ruling party ticket. The ease of winning opposition nominations drives prospective candidates to the opposition.

Winning a party nomination is also not a hurdle that candidates encounter once. Incumbent legislators from the ruling party face substantial competition in re-election bids. My research in Tanzania tracked the political careers of several hundred members of parliament (MPs) who have since left the legislature. While the majority of opposition MPs who leave the legislature are defeated in re-election bids or voluntarily step down, nearly 60 percent of turnover of MPs from ruling party CCM occurs at the nomination stage.

The competitiveness of ruling party nomination contests may also play into the hands of the opposition during an election. In bitterly-contested or mismanaged primaries, ruling party candidates' direct resources away from election campaigns and spurned nomination seekers may foment intraparty factionalism or defect to the opposition.⁸

On election day, opposition candidates face significant disadvantages that make winning seats difficult. However, the barriers to candidacy for the ruling party occur even earlier than the election itself. When considering the interplay

in *Transitional Politics: A Research Note*, *Party Politics* 14 (September 2008): 620-639; Shane Mac Giollabhui, “How Things Fell Apart: Candidate Selection and the Cohesion of Parties in South Africa and Namibia,” *Party Politics* 19 (July 2011): 577-600; Magnus Ohman, *The Heart and Soul of the Party: Candidate Selection in Ghana and in Africa* (Uppsala, Sweden: Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2004).

8. See: Nahomi Ichino and Noah L. Nathan. “Do Primaries Improve Electoral Performance? Evidence from Ghana,” *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (April 2013): 428-441.

6. See: Guillermo Trejo, “The Ballot and the Street: An Electoral Theory of Social Protest in Autocracies,”

7. In addition to my work, see: Bonnie N Field and Peter M. Siavelis. “Candidate Selection Procedures

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between election and nomination prospects, opposition candidates are less strategically misguided under a cost-benefit framework.

Component 3. Differences between Opposition and Ruling Party Candidates: Diverse Benefits; Benefits of Losing; Costs of Running

The logic undergirding accounts of co-optation is that candidates want similar things from office—material, patronage goods—and that the ruling party has a comparative advantage in delivering these benefits. Drawing from in-depth interviews with legislators in several African countries, my research suggests that candidates are not uniformly motivated by material goods. I find that there are four main benefits of office candidates seek in electoral authoritarian regimes: (1) the public prestige and prominence of being a public official, (2) the chance to implement ideological and policy goals, (3) opportunities to advance private career interests, as well as (4) material goods associated with holding office. My dissertation demonstrates that all candidates value each of these benefits to some degree, but opposition candidates and ruling party candidates differ in how much they value each benefit.

Candidates from CCM mainly desired material benefits of legislative office, including discretionary development funds, tax benefits, and Parliamentary sitting allowances (“*mapasho*”). Material benefits constituted about 40 percent of all benefits of office identified by ruling party candidates. CCM respondents also identified holding office as a means of advancing private business interests. Candidates from all parties also cited CCM as the best provider of material benefits.

Opposition candidates most commonly identified policy and ideological benefits as a reason to run for office. Following scholars like Kenneth Greene, I show that promises to implement rapid political reform, deepen democratization, and advance socio-political issues like women’s rights lure candidates to the opposition. These candidates also enjoy the prestige of holding public office, like speaking to local and international audiences through public forums, news media, and party press conferences.

In addition to heterogeneity between ruling party and opposition candidates in terms of what they want from office, there are also differences in whether the benefits may be obtained from losing a nomination contest, losing an election, or both. For the ruling party, a failed primary candidate can extract conciliatory positions in the ruling party offered to keep him/her from defecting and gain greater popularity for later nomination contests.

For the opposition, losing an election can serve several goals. First, being on the ballot is one way to increase valence amongst voters even without spending much on a campaign. By running and losing, candidates also gain experience in a “baptism by fire” and learn campaign skills along the way. Individuals who see benefits in losing may not be very discouraged by the opposition’s poor electoral prospects.

The final difference between opposition versus ruling party candidates pertains to campaign spending and willingness to bear financial and non-material (physical security) candidacy costs.

Running on opposition tickets in electoral authoritarian regimes can be very costly. The opposition lacks access to government coffers to fund

campaigns. The ruling party can also restrict access to public media. The opposition must develop creative campaign strategies and also lean on candidates to self-finance their campaigns. By contrast, a ruling party can support their candidates’ campaigns with public funds. This leads to an expectation that opposition candidates will bear more financial costs of election campaigns.

In a survey I implemented with legislative candidates in Tanzania, I found that opposition candidates actually contribute less to campaigns than CCM candidates. In terms of total costs, personal contributions, and party support, ruling party campaigns were substantially more expensive. Even though the ruling party can bankroll candidates, CCM hopefuls expect campaign investments to yield significant returns in office. Candidates from the opposition and ruling party also spend their campaign funds differently. The opposition allocates a larger proportion of resources to large public events like rallies as well as party regalia (*fulana* in Swahili). These public displays of opposition support help shape citizen perceptions about the electoral viability of opposition and allay voter fears that of being singled out by the government as a lone-wolf opposition supporter.

There are, however, two other ways in which opposition candidates pay higher costs on the campaign trail. First, opposition candidates also engage in more labor-intensive campaign tactics: about 40 percent of opposition candidates named personal canvassing as a very effective way to turnout their supporters. They report this strategy as the *most* effective way to win over

CCM supporters, even in spite of the hazards of going door-to-door to court loyal supporters of an authoritarian government.

This canvassing finding speaks to the second higher cost opposition candidates incur during campaigns: they are significantly more willing to bear non-material costs of running. My survey work in Tanzania assesses this through several approaches, including attitudes towards Swahili proverbs (“*metwali*”) which are particularly well-suited for measuring risk attitudes. Opposition candidates are less discouraged by punishments from investigations of personal and financial affairs to physical suffering and violence in the pursuit of their political goals. Even members of youth and women’s wings of opposition parties are more willing than ruling party legislators to take on these non-material costs and risks.

Conclusions

The research program of electoral authoritarianism has come far in recent years. This piece points to areas of future advancement. First, greater attention must be paid to opposition candidates. These individuals are the public face of the opposition and on the front lines of struggles against the ruling party. More generally, focusing on opposition as actors with agency is key to understanding how they

interact with and challenge autocratic governments. Far too often, we rely on theories about autocratic actors to do the theoretical work of explaining opposition behavior.

Second, understanding candidacy requires us to turn the clock back on the choice to run for office and look to life trajectories leading up that snapshot decision. This insight also applies to candidacy more generally. My work shows that early exposure to civic activism initiates a path to opposition candidacy, while “career partisanship” is a critical stage of ruling party candidacy.

Third, intraparty politics in electoral authoritarian regimes is a promising direction for research on opposition and candidacy. Considering how election prospects are structured by candidate selection procedures is important. Between parties and within them over time, nomination contests vary in competitiveness, centralization, and exclusiveness. Those factors shape the attractiveness of seeking a nomination with the ruling party versus opposition, even for purely strategic individuals.

Last, my work joins a new vein of research in authoritarian settings—and developing countries more broadly—that questions whether the motivations of elites to run for office are so monolithic. My research in Tanzania shows that opposition candidates in

electoral authoritarian regimes value more than the government resources that the ruling party controls. They are also not simply staunch anti-government critics who rabble-rouse for the sake of doing so. Advancing policy issues through the prominence of campaigns and legislatures is one component of a profile of benefits they seek from running. Further, reaching their goals of running need not hinge on winning a seat in the legislature. Opposition candidates are also willing to pay a lot more than their ruling party counterparts to get those benefits—not in financing campaigns but in risks of standing against electoral authoritarian regimes.

Discerning why candidates run on opposition tickets is the first step to unlocking more significant questions for understanding the future of democratization in the twenty-first century: how does weak and budding opposition grow and strengthen? Insight on how nascent opposition evolves into a credible challenger of the government can shed light on how the opposition may eventually defeat them.

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The literature disagrees, though, on the causal relevance of peaceful protests, once they do occur under dictatorship. Some scholars emphasize their *disruptive* potential: When popular protests pierce the surface of authoritarian tranquility, they tend to escalate and push regimes into crises of survival.⁴ Others emphasize their *reactive* nature: Mass protests tend to erupt in response to emergent troubles of the political regime. In and by themselves, they are unlikely to cause such troubles.⁵

However, as an accumulating body of case evidence suggests, the assumption that popular protests are rare under dictatorship as well as the related debate about their disruptive or reactive nature appear to be misleading. In many autocracies and most prominently in contemporary China, citizens seem to be willing and capable of generating contentious challenges on a regular basis; and authoritarian rulers seem to be willing and capable of “normalizing” and absorbing these challenges into their operating routines. Rather than rare, disruptive events that provoke existential crises, or reactive moves that aggravate such crises, recurring popular

protests seem to form an integral part of political normality in many authoritarian regimes.⁶ My hunch is that the accumulating case evidence of frequent protest under authoritarianism may hold beyond a few prominent countries. *Tertium datur*, intermediate possibilities exist, between quiescent equilibria and contentious crises of dictatorship.

Disturbing Protest

Country experts tend to read regular protests in autocracies such as China in *functionalist* terms: Rather than putting authoritarian regimes into question, they contribute to their smooth operation. Acts of public protest under dictatorship are conventionally seen as acts of anti-regime challenge, as instances of popular contention, confrontation, defiance, resistance. Contemporary students of “contentious authoritarianism” (Xi Chen), by contrast, interpret them as acts of tacit collaboration between protesters and authorities that do not challenge the authoritarian status quo, but actually serve to perpetuate it by rendering it more legitimate and more efficient.⁷

I suspect that extant theoretical perspectives misconstrue both the causal force and the motivational bases of citizen protest against dictatorship. As I hypothesize, most protest demonstrations against authoritarian regimes are neither disruptive, nor reactive, nor submissive. Neither do they bring down dictators (or accelerate their downfall in the wake of crises) nor

do they serve the smooth functioning of authoritarianism.

If anti-authoritarian citizens are competent observers of their political environment, they should know it's hard to topple a dictatorship through public protest. If they are committed to the cause of political freedom, they should be reluctant to drop their quest for regime change in favor of minor, more acceptable policy demands. I therefore expect them to be neither quiescent nor revolutionary nor opportunistic – but disturbing. Even if citizen protest fails to bring down the regime or to purchase particularistic concessions from the regime, it is not futile. It serves to communicate dissent and herein to irritate the official story of authoritarian legitimacy. Its main role is informational.

Protest demonstrations do what they are supposed to do: they demonstrate. They publicize popular discontentment, show that the surface of citizen quiescence is deceptive. By tearing the veil of generalized “preference falsification” (Timur Kuran) they may not ignite revolution. But they do not play into the hands of the dictator either. Neither frightening nor submissive, they still unsettle the authoritarian standard script of social harmony and popular gratitude. They disturb the dramaturgical self-complacency of the regime.


My (largely) inductive hypothesis of the “disturbing normality” of peaceful popular protest in authoritarian regimes carries two simple empirical implications. Firstly, if mass demonstrations indeed are ordinary phenomena in many authoritarian regimes, rather than exceptional disruptive events, we need to see them happening with some frequency. Secondly, if “normal” protest strives to

4. See e.g. Mark Granovetter, “Threshold Models of Collective Behavior,” *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (May 1978): 1420–1443; Susanne Lohmann, “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91,” *World Politics* 47 (October 1994): 42–101; Timur Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification* (Cambridge, MASS. and London: Harvard University Press, 1995); Jay Ulfelder, “Contentious Collective Action and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes,” *International Political Science Review* 26 (June 2005): 311–334; and Johannes Gerschewski and Wolfgang Merkel (2015), “Crises in autocratic regimes: An analytical framework” (unpublished typescript, Social Science Research Center, Berlin, 2015).

5. See e.g. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 48; Sidney Tarrow, “Aiming at a Moving Target: Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern Europe,” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 24 (March 1991): 12–20.

6. See e.g. Graeme B. Robertson, *The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia Countries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Guillermo Trejo, *Popular Movements in Autocracies: Religion, Repression, and Indigenous Collective Action in Mexico* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

7. See e.g. Peter L. Lorentzen, “Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8 (August 2013): 127–158; Kevin J. O'Brien, “Rightful Resistance,” *World Politics* 49 (October 1996): 31–55.

Figure 1: Organized or spontaneous protest demonstrations by regime type, annual averages, 1990–2012

Source: Social Conflict in Analysis Database (SCAD); regional coverage: Africa, Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

Source: Social Conflict in Analysis Database (SCAD); regional coverage: Africa, Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

communicate genuine political dissent, rather than performing a delicate dance of self-discipline and good conduct for central authorities, we should see it go beyond small scales and local concerns. To probe the plausibility of these hypotheses, I look at some simple descriptive data from the recently released Social Conflict in Analysis Database (SCAD) by Idean Salehyan from the University of North Texas and Cullen Hendrix from the University of Denver (www.scaddata.org).

Protest Frequency

The SCAD database is the successor to the Social Conflict in Africa Database, extending its coverage to Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean (1990–2013). Its units of analysis are individual conflict events, rather than the conventional country-years. From 1990 through 2012, these data cover 66 autocracies and 929 regime years. Within this sample of authoritarian regimes, they register 3006 protest demonstrations, an average of 3.2 events per year, which is, as Figure 1 shows, slightly higher than in democracies (2.2 demonstrations per year).⁸

8. The SCAD dataset does not distinguish between regime types. To identify authoritarian country-years I drew the dividing line between democracy and dictatorship following the operational proposal

This simple distribution of protest frequencies provides strong empirical support for my initial “normality hypothesis.” Rather than rare and unusual events, protest demonstrations (as well as other types of contentions actions) seem to belong to the regular political landscape of numerous authoritarian regimes. As it appears, rather than calmly presiding over quiescent, silent subjects, many autocrats have to manage a rather constant stream of contentious challenges from below.

The Scale of Demonstrations

How significant are the protest

advanced by Michael Wahman, Jan Teorell, and Axel Hadenius in their Authoritarian Regimes Dataset (“Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective,” *Contemporary Politics* 19 [January 2013]: 19–34). Given my exclusive interest in protest demonstrations, I excluded all demonstrations that were staged in support of the government. In its appendix, the book chapter mentioned in Footnote 1 includes the corresponding list of regimes, regime years, and event frequencies. Note that I am treating authoritarian regimes as a homogenous category, ignoring the profound differences between authoritarian subtypes that have animated the study of authoritarian regimes over the past years (see e.g. Barbara Geddes, “What do we know about democratization after twenty years?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (June 1999): 115–44; Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, “Pathways from Authoritarianism,” *Journal of Democracy* 18 (January 2007): 143–156; Andreas Schedler, *The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism* 9 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013).


demonstrations autocrats face on an ordinary basis? Are we talking about fleeting, minuscule events in remote regions, or large, prolonged protest campaigns in major cities? Figure 2 indicates broad empirical variance.

Size. While large protests involving over 100 thousand participants are rather rare (3.2 percent), the portion of very small protests (with less than 100 participants) is not very large either (16.8 percent) (of course, very small events are most likely to go unreported by international news agencies). Well over a third of all demonstrations under authoritarianism sponsor between 100 and 1000 participants (36.2 percent) and another third between one and ten thousand (33.6 percent). Rather than self-sacrificial performances of super-minoritarian radicals, these seem to be quite broad and significant expressions of dissidence (see Figure 2).

Duration. In autocracies, only few protest demonstrations seem to be part of sustained nonviolent “resistance campaigns.” The overwhelming majority consists in short-lived one-day events (80.1 percent). Only a fraction

9. See Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

Figure 2: Scale and motives of protest demonstrations under authoritarianism, 1990–2012



Source: Author calculations with data from Social Conflict in Analysis Database (SCAD); regional coverage: Africa, Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

last longer than a week (6.4 percent) (see Figure 1b).

Territorial reach. Popular rebellions do not necessarily start in the capital city. The 2011 mass protests in Tunisia, Libya, and Syria, for instance, began in provincial cities. Yet, unless protests reach a country's political center, they are more easily contained. As Figure 2c indicates, rural protests are rare events in autocracies (or do not make it into the

headlines). Only 8.5 percent of protest demonstrations under authoritarianism took place in villages or cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants. Yet, at the other end of the territorial threat scale, genuinely national protests are uncommon as well (5.6 percent). The bulk of protest either takes place in the capital city (58.5 percent) or in major cities outside the capital (27.4 percent).

In sum, even if most protest

demonstrations under authoritarianism are on-and-off events that happen on a specific day and seldom survive their first week, they do seem to assemble significant numbers of participants (between 100 and 100,000) on significant places (the capital city or other major cities).

The Motives of Demonstrations

Above all, students of contentious action in contemporary China have

been reading popular protest under authoritarianism as essentially regime-supportive: useful and domesticated, tolerated, encouraged, or even managed by political elites. Do such functional diagnoses of regime-friendly protest apply to other authoritarian regimes as well? Are the peaceful protest demonstrations that take place in autocracies protest demonstrations at all? Do they really count as autonomous acts of defiance, challenge, resistance, confrontation, rebellion, protest, dissidence? Or are they no more than sophisticated forms of tacit collaboration between subnational protest entrepreneurs and national authorities?

The SCAD Database does not (and cannot) contain fine-grained information on the discursive framing of conflict events. Yet, it does register in a rough manner what kind of grievances protesters articulated (“the first issue that was mentioned at the source of the tension / disorder”) and whether “the central government” was “the target of the event.”¹⁰

Grievances. While in almost one eighth of registered demonstrations under authoritarianism the motives of protest remain unclear (13.4 percent), a fair number of protests indeed limit themselves to articulating more

innocuous complaints about economic issues (19.8 percent) or foreign affairs (14.0 percent). However, at least half of protest demonstrations under authoritarianism fail to respect the taboo of criticizing the political regime and do articulate grievances about democracy, elections, and human rights (47.3 per cent) (see Figure 2d).

Targets. Contrary to the image of local movements bringing local issues to the attention of local authorities, two thirds of all protest demonstrations under authoritarianism target the central government (67.9 percent). Only a small minority of reported demonstrations address local authorities (5.5 percent) (see Figure 2e). Of course, international news agencies are likely to underreport demonstrations that do not target the national centers of power.

Conclusion

The empirical patterns that emerged in our simple, descriptive, explorative analysis of peaceful protests in Africa, Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean are inconsistent with the notion that mass contention is rare under authoritarianism. They also run counter the notion of anticipatory obedience by risk-averse protesters. Rather than staging innocuous forms of protest that limit themselves to pre-approved themes and non-threatening strategies, contentious actors regularly articulate sensitive grievances in challenging ways. If they know what scholars of comparative politics know, namely,

that popular protests are unlikely to shake or even shatter an authoritarian regime, we have to conclude that their expressions of dissent are principled, rather than opportunistic.

Despite their rough and preliminary quality, our empirical explorations suggest the possibility that the current comparative literature on authoritarian regimes has been developing a large blind spot. In the neo-functionalist emphasis it places on strategic equilibria, institutional safeguards, and distributive policies, it tends to overlook the contentious quality of authoritarian governance. As it seems, there is more to the politics of authoritarian governance than the design of institutions and the distribution of rents. It involves constant public engagement with multifarious public challenges by principled opponents who do not wish to signal their fundamental conformity through calibrated acts of self-constrained protest, but rather to communicate serious dissent through genuine acts of defiance. Even when democratic citizens know they can't bring down the regime, they can at least rumple its pretensions of popular consent. Even when they can't chase the autocrat out of the presidential palace, they can at least disturb his self-complacent narrative of dictatorial popularity.

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10. Idean Salehyan and Cullen Hendrix, “Social Conflict in Analysis Database Version 3.1: Codebook and coding procedures,” *Codebook Version 3.1* (Austin: University of Texas, 2014), pp. 4–5, available at www.scaddata.org.

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consider the costs of repression associated with a free media or effective domestic courts. In the final section of the paper, we replicate the empirical findings of previous work on cooptation and government repression, extending it to show that the nefarious effect of cooptative institutions on repression can sometimes be minimized when leaders are otherwise constrained.

Autocratic Cooptation & Repression

Although a dictator's primary goal is to remain in power, threats to dictatorial rule are frequent. In order to better solidify their hold on power, dictators have increasingly turned to the creation of cooptative domestic institutions like state-recognized political opposition parties and institutionalized legislatures. When they are created, these institutions are rarely intended to generate full transitions to democracy, and instead help dictators to divide their domestic political opposition, reduce opposition threats, better control opposition demands, distribute spoils to ruling party politicians, feign democratic legitimacy, and extend the duration of the authoritarian regime. In particular, the creation of political opposition parties is argued to be a method by which authoritarian leaders can distribute patronage and manage elite conflicts; dictatorial legislatures also provide an "institutional forum" to lower the transaction costs of granting concessions and better enable the dictator to monitor and control the opposition.²

2. See, for example, Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Jennifer Gandhi, *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships," *Economics & Politics* 18 (March 2006): 1-26; Beatriz Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Will H Moore, "The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion,"

Aside from providing venues through which to "buy off" the opposition and rarely leading to true democratization, institutionalized cooptation in the form of political opposition parties and legislatures often results in increased repression. State torture, for example, is higher in dictatorships where power is shared by legalized parties. When dictators allow multiple political parties to exist, members of the opposition are more likely to speak out against the incumbent regime. Because dictatorships are "protorture" regimes, they are likely to respond to opposition demands by violating human rights. Dictators may even go so far as to liberalize but continue to violate human rights as a costly signal to the opposition that they are willing to do so.³

Although many arguments explaining why dictatorships engage in more repression than their democratic counterparts focus on dictators' lack of ability to influence politics by other means, the most recent literature on the effect of cooptative institutions on human rights disaggregates state repression. Dictatorial institutions created to coopt the opposition can have heterogenous effects on different forms of state repression. When leaders are unclear about the nature of their opposition and the origins of potential threats to their tenure, they engage in empowerment rights violations to quell diffuse threats. Empowerment rights violations, which "involve state or state-affiliated limitations on rights" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (February 2000): 107-127.

3. See, for example, James R. Hollyer and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics, and Non-Compliance," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 6 (June 2011): 275-327; James Raymond Vreeland, "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships enter into the United Nations Convention against Torture," *International Organization* 62 (January 2008): 65-101.

ranging from expression and belief to association and assembly to social freedoms," are often applied broadly and indiscriminately and are intended to limit the ability of diffuse groups to mobilize against the incumbent regime. Institutionalized political parties and legislatures reduce dictators' costs of identifying threatening opposition members. As such, when dictators are able to institutionalize opposition parties and convince them to meet in a legislature, they are better able to know (and target) threatening opposition groups with more precision, driving indiscriminate violations of human rights down and targeted violations of physical integrity rights that "seek to modify behavior and attitudes by threatening human life through imprisonment, disappearances, torture or mass killings" up. As a result of these arguments, previous research presents and finds support for two testable hypotheses.⁴

Hypothesis 1. *Institutional cooptation should decrease the repression of empowerment rights.*

Hypothesis 2. *Institutional cooptation should increase the repression of physical integrity rights.*

In the following section, we extend previous research on cooptative institutions and human rights, arguing that the positive effect of cooptative institutions on targeted autocratic repression—physical integrity violations—is mitigated when leaders face additional institutional constraints on repression—specifically, when they must consider the costs of repression associated with a free media or effective

4. For more on this argument and the definitions of empowerment rights and physical integrity rights, see Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, "A Dictator's Toolkit: Understanding How Cooptation Affects Repression in Autocracies," *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (March 2014): 332-346

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domestic courts. We then replicate the results of previous research and extend those analyses to test our hypotheses about the mediating effect of constraining institutions on state repression.

Autocratic Cooptation, Constraint, and Repression

Although cooptative institutions are argued to lead to increased physical integrity violations in autocracies, other domestic institutions are commonly linked to *improvements* in government respect for human rights. The most commonly cited constraint on state repression is democracy; the relationship between democracy and respect for human rights is so well-known that it has been referred to as the Domestic Democratic Peace. Several “democratic” institutions are argued to be responsible for this relationship, including those that increase accountability to the public like elections, those that protect minorities like courts, and those that split government decision-making into many hands. Regardless of which institution is responsible for the positive relationship between democracy and human rights protections, institutions are argued to “work” because they increase the costs of repression for leaders—even dictators.⁵

In addition to contested elections, which dictatorships clearly do not possess, two domestic political institutions have been argued to constrain repression by increasing the costs of violating physical integrity rights: a free press/media that serves as a “watchdog” over the government and effective domestic

5. See, for example, Christian Davenport, *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Emilia Justyna Powell and Jeffrey K. Staton, “Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violations,” *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (March 2009): 149–174.

courts that make the judicial costs of violating rights non-negligible. Because they increase the dictator’s costs of repression, these institutions cut against the incentives to repress that often accompany the creation of cooptative dictatorial institutions. As a result, the positive effects of opposition parties and institutionalized legislatures on repression are mitigated in dictatorships that have either a free press or an effective court.

With regard to media freedom, we are interested in the freedom of the press from government censorship. A free press can serve as a “watchdog” on government violations of human rights. As a result, governments in countries where the media is free from government intrusion are generally more responsive to citizen demands. In short, a free press can act as a constraint on human rights violations—even in autocracies—by reporting government violations of human rights and making it more costly for the government to engage in repression. For example, freedom of the press is consistently associated with the termination of government torture across political regime types.⁶

Effective courts are also known to limit human rights violations—even in dictatorships. On average, state leaders facing effective domestic courts are less likely to violate human rights than executives in states with ineffective judiciaries. Courts are effective when they are free from state manipulation,

6. On responsiveness, see Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, *The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect* (Three Rivers Press 2007). For a conflicting view and a definition of media freedom, see Jenifer Whitten Woodring, “Watchdog or Lapdog? Media Freedom, Regime Type, and Government Respect for Human Rights,” *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (September 2009): 595–625; On torture, see Courtenay R Conrad and Will H. Moore, “What Stops the Torture?” *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (April 2010): 459–476.

and when other actors are willing and able to punish noncompliant executives. State authorities facing effective judiciaries are more likely to incur costs from litigation under domestic law for two reasons. First, victims are more likely to bring allegations of violations before the court when they believe the judiciary to be effective. Second, increasingly effective judiciaries are more likely to turn litigation into costs either because the violating leaders must comply with the court’s stated remedy, or because the court enjoys sufficient support to punish noncompliant executives.⁷

In conjunction, the theory presented above and these discussions about the constraining effect of the media and the judiciary on state repression lead us to posit a conditional hypothesis about the effect of cooptative institutions on physical integrity violations in autocracies, which we test in the following section.

Hypothesis 3. *Institutional cooptation is positively associated with the violation of physical integrity rights in countries where there are few constraints on state repression. As constraints on state repression (i.e., media freedom, judicial effectiveness) increase, institutional cooptation becomes less positively associated with the violation of physical integrity rights.*

The Conditional Effect of Cooptation on Repression

To test our Hypothesis 3, we use replication data previously used to test Hypothesis 1 and 2.⁸ Because we

7. For a brief review and a discussion of empirical measures, see Julio Rios-Figueroa and Jeffrey K. Staton, “An Evaluation of Cross-National Measures of Judicial Independence,” Working Paper, 2009.

8. These data come from Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “A Dictator’s Toolkit: Understanding How Cooptation Affects Repression in Autocracies,” *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (March 2014): 332–346. Data on the dependent variable come from David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, “The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset,” Volume

Table 1: Effect of Cooptation and Constraint on Physical Integrity Rights Repression

| | F & KT Results | F & KT Replication | Media Constraint | Court Constraint |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Cooptation | .22* (.08) | .22* (.07) | .31* (.10) | .24 (.15) |
| Media Freedom | — | — | .29 (.22) | — |
| Judicial Effectiveness | — | — | — | -1.94* (1.27) |
| Cooptation x Media Freedom | — | — | -.16 (.09) | — |
| Cooptation x Judicial Effectiveness | — | — | — | .04 (.49) |
| N | 1,583 | 1,583 | 1,583 | 1,560 |

NOTES: Results from an ordered logit model. * Significant within 95% CI; two-tailed test. Column 2 shows results from Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014), Table II, Column 3. Column 3 replicates those results. Coefficients on control variables and cutpoints were omitted to save space, but are available upon request.

are interested only in the conditional effect of cooptative institutions on physical integrity violations, we limit our replication and analyses to that dependent variable. We use data from the CIRI Project to measure physical integrity violations, inverting the scale so that higher numbers equal more physical integrity violations. We measure our key independent variable, cooptation, using data from on political parties and legislatures. The variable “takes values of 0 (no legislature and no political parties); 1 (no legislature and one or more political parties; legislature and no political parties); 2 (legislature and one political party); and 3 (legislature and multiple political parties).”

Column 2 of Table 1 shows the original results. Before testing our conditional hypothesis, we attempted to replicate these results; the results of our replication are shown in the third column of Table 1. Although our results are slightly different, they are remarkably similar, boosting our confidence in the replication. In order to test our hypothesis that the effect of opposition cooptation on physical integrity repression is dependent upon domestic constraint, we require measures of Media Freedom and Judicial Effectiveness. We

2010.08.15. (Binghamton, NY: Binghamton University, 2010), available at www.humanrightsdata.org. Data on the main independent variables come from Jose Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi and James Raymond Vreeland, “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.” *Public Choice* 143 (April 2010): 67-101.

measure Media Freedom using data from the CIRI Data Collection Project. Their measure ranges from 0 to 2, where higher values represent higher levels of freedom of expression and freedom of the media. We measure Judicial Effectiveness using a continuous measure based on an item response theory (IRT) model that culls information from multiple measures of judicial independence and power, the measure ranges from 0 to 1, where higher values represent country-years with more effective domestic judicial system. In the results presented in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1, we include a term that interacts each of these measures with cooptation to test our conditional hypotheses.⁹

Column 4 shows the effects of opposition cooptation on repression conditional on the

9. Original results come from Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “A Dictator’s Toolkit: Understanding How Cooptation Affects Repression in Autocracies,” *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (March 2014): 332-346. Frantz and Kendall-Taylor did not indicate in their replication materials the precise method by which they combined their data sets following multiple imputation to deal with missing data. We chose to combine the imputed data sets using Clarify. For more information on Clarify, see Gary King, Michael Tomz and Jason Wittenberg, “Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation,” *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (April 2000): 347-361. Data on media freedom come from the CIRI data cited above; data on judicial effectiveness come from Drew A. Linzer and Jeffrey K. Staton, “A Measurement Model for Synthesizing Multiple Comparative Indicators: The Case of Judicial Independence,” Manuscript (Atlanta: Emory University, 2011), available at www.polisci.emory.edu/faculty/jkstaton/resources/WorkingPapers/LinzerStaton.pdf

leader being constrained by a free media. Cooptation is positively and significantly related to physical integrity violations in countries with no media freedom (i.e., when Media Freedom = 0). The negative coefficient on Cooptation x Media Freedom shows that as the media gets more free, the positive association between Cooptation and government repression decreases. Although we do not present substantive effects here for space considerations, this result is consistent with Hypothesis 3: the positive effect of opposition cooptation on physical integrity violations is lessened as media freedom increases. The results presented in Column 5 of Table 1 for judicial effectiveness as a constraint provide less support for our hypothesis. The coefficient on Cooptation indicates a positive effect on physical integrity violations when courts are ineffective, although the coefficient does not reach traditional levels of statistical significance. Judicial effectiveness has a negative and significant effect on government repression in countries where there is no cooptation of the opposition. The interaction term indicates that the point estimate on Cooptation when judicial effectiveness equals zero increases as judicial effectiveness increases. The coefficient is not significant, however, and tests of substantive significance show that the effect of cooptation is insignificant across the range of judicial effectiveness.

Conrad and Woo

Conclusion

Although not definitive, our empirical results provide tentative support for the hypothesis that the nefarious effect of opposition cooptation on physical integrity rights repression can potentially be moderated in countries where leaders face domestic constraints that make repression costly. More specifically, although courts do not seem to minimize the effect of cooptative institutions on repression, access to a free media limits human rights violations even when leaders are otherwise motivated to

repress. Although our research design does not provide us with much leverage over determining the causal effect of opposition cooptation on government repression, it does provide us with information about interesting associations and offers us fodder for future research on opposition cooptation and government repression in autocracies. Future work on these topics should take seriously the potential joint effects of domestic institutions on both opposition and leader behavior in authoritarian regimes. Institutions rarely

have independent effects on behavioral outcomes; instead, their effects are often conditional on the larger institutional environment.

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AKSOY, CONTINUED

(continued from page 3)

populations easier access to peaceful channels of political participation, this finding has been puzzling for scholars of political violence.

To explain patterns of terrorism in democracies and dictatorships, one strand of literature focuses on the existence of political and civil freedoms, such as freedoms of movement, association and expression in democracies.² The main idea in this set of studies is that political and civil liberties influence the ability of discontented political actors to disseminate information, recruit members, and coordinate violent activities. Accordingly, in democracies where such freedoms exist, it is easier to form and operate terrorist organizations. However, in dictatorships the lack of political and civil freedoms severely limits the organizational capacity of discontented actors who might have incentives to use violence to attain their political goals. Thus, dictatorships experience lower levels of terrorism than democracies.

A second line of argument focuses mostly on the ability of incumbent executives to respond to terrorist violence.³ While dictators can ostensibly repress discontented groups without concern for protecting civil liberties and use draconian measures against the suspects or perpetrators of terrorism, democratic executives are constrained in their ability to use harsh counterterrorism measures.

David B. Carter, "Terrorist Group and Government Interaction: Progress in Empirical Research," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 6 (October 2012): 108–124.

2. See for instance Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13 (July 1981): 379–99; and Alex Schmid, "Terrorism and Democracy," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4 (December 1992): 14–25.

3. See for instance Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97 (August 2003): 343–361; and Quan Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (April 2005): 278–297.

Some scholars therefore believe that constraints on the executive powers of democratic incumbents make them more likely targets of terrorism. For example, Quan Li argues that democracies experience more transnational terrorism than non-democracies due to more executive constraints, and relatedly Robert Pape notes that democracies are more likely targets of suicide terrorism than non-democracies because they are more likely to make concessions to groups and more restrained in their use of force than non-democracies. Overall, this set of research suggests that repressive responses to terrorism in dictatorships raise the cost of using violence for discontented groups. As a result, dictatorships do not experience as much terrorism as democracies.

A more recent explanation emphasizes the differences in the nature of political competition across democracies and non-democracies. Erica Chenoweth argues that democracies experience more terrorism than non-democracies because of relatively intense political competition, which motivates groups with different interests to compete for influence. In democracies fierce political competition results in crowding effects, and groups that want to express their grievances and attain their political goals perceive a need to "outdo" one another. This often entails an escalation to violence.⁴

Overall, an important limitation of research on regime type and terrorism is the dichotomous classification of regimes into two broad categories of democracy and non-democracy. We know that there is important variation across democracies in terms of the political institutions that are relevant for the emergence and management

4. Erica Chenoweth, "Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity," *Journal of Politics* 72 (January 2010): 16–30.

of political violence and instability. For example, democracies differ from one another in terms of their electoral institutions, which are shown to influence the ease of access to peaceful channels of electoral competition. In his highly influential study, Bingham Powell finds evidence that democracies with permissive proportional electoral rules experience less political violence and instability than those with majoritarian rules, and a large body of subsequent research on domestic political violence, ethnic violence and rebellions find similar evidence for the role of electoral institutions in influencing the occurrence and intensity of these outcomes.⁵

Scholars of terrorism have only recently started to acknowledge the importance of institutional design moving beyond the dichotomous classification of regime types. However, this research has largely focused on democracies. Thus, to explain differences in patterns of terrorism across democracies, scholars have begun focusing on different aspects of institutions, such as electoral institutions, political party systems, number of veto players, and levels of decentralization, and judicial independence, which are likely to influence discontented groups' motivations to use terrorism.⁶

5. G. Bingham Powell, *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1982); Matthew Krain, "Violence, and Event Count Models Contemporary Democracies Revisited: Democracy, Political Violence, and Event Count Models," *Comparative Political Studies* 31 (April 1998): 139–64; Stephen M. Saideman, David J. Lanoue, Michael Campenni et al., "Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled, Cross-Sectional Time Series Analysis from 1985–1998," *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (February 2002): 103–129; Frank S. Cohen, "Proportional Versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies* 30 (October 1997): 607–30.

6. See for example Deniz Aksoy and David Carter, "Electoral Institutions and the Emergence of Terrorist Groups," *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (January 2014): 181–204; Joseph K. Young and Laura Dugan, "Veto Players and Terror," *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (January 2011): 19–33; James

Aksoy

Authoritarian Institutions and Terrorism

While research on the relationship between democratic political institutions and terrorism is burgeoning, relatively little attention has been paid to the relationship between authoritarian institutions and political violence. This is largely due to the disconnect between the terrorism literature and the rich comparative politics literature on authoritarian institutions.

A voluminous literature on authoritarian institutions argue that non-democracies differ significantly from one another in terms of their institutional arrangements and political institutions can influence important political outcomes, policy choices and dictators' chances of survival in power.⁷ An important argument in this literature is that institutions, such as legislatures and parties, can be instrumental in helping a dictator secure the tacit support of potential opponents and discontented groups. Accordingly, authoritarian political institutions can shape the incentives and opportunities available for discontented political actors to use alternative means to achieve their political goals, including terrorism.

In Aksoy, Carter and Wright (2012) my coauthors and I provide the first

A. Piazza, "Terrorism and Party Systems in the States of India," *Security Studies* 19 (February 2010): 99–123; and Bruno S. Frey and Simon Luechinger, "Decentralization as a Disincentive for Terror," *European Journal of Political Economy* 20 (April 2004): 509–515.

7. See for example Benjamin Smith, "Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule," *World Politics* 57 (April 2005): 421–451; Beatriz Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (November 2007): 1279–1301; Joseph Wright, "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Impact Economic Growth and Investment," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (April 2008): 322–343; and Jennifer Gandhi and Wonik Kim, "Coopting Workers under Dictatorship," *Journal of Politics* 72 (July 2010): 646–658.

explanation of patterns of terrorism across dictatorships focusing on the role of authoritarian political institutions. Even though most dictatorships experience less terrorism than democracies, terrorism is still a significant phenomenon under such regimes. For example, between 1970 and 2007 roughly 2021 terrorist groups existed globally, and roughly one-quarter of the groups emerged in authoritarian regimes. Moreover, of the nearly 84 thousand attacks in the Global Terrorism Database, one of the most widely used sources of data on terrorism, around 40 percent occurred in non-democracies. Furthermore, within this time period dictatorships differed from one another in terms of how much terrorism they experienced. For example, Chile under Pinochet, one of the most repressive military governments in Latin America, experienced orders of magnitude more terrorism than the former Yugoslavia under Tito.

We focus on two political institutions relevant for appeasing discontented opponents: opposition parties and legislatures. Many dictatorships have elected legislatures, which hold regular sessions and bring together multiple political parties while others lack a legislature but have active opposition political parties, and there are also other dictatorships without legislatures or political parties. Literature on authoritarian institutions shows that opposition political parties can be useful in enabling dictators to co-opt their opponents as parties can help bargain with opposition political leaders and distribute rents in a more efficient manner to opponents.⁸ However, my

8. See for example Lisa Blaydes, *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Ellen Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World. Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

coauthors and I argue that active opposition political parties can also have some unexpected consequences for dictators. Opposition political party activities, even under dictatorships, can bring together similarly minded people, facilitate communication among elites and dissemination of information. Accordingly, political parties often increase the collective action capacity of opponents or discontented groups.

Legislatures under dictatorships can serve as a forum to bargain over policy concessions to secure the loyalty of opposition and they can provide a venue for the opponents to voice their political grievances without threatening the dictators and their regimes.⁹ Accordingly, in Aksoy, Carter and Wright (2012) we argue that when opposition political parties exist, organized opposition can seek concessions within the legislature. Under this scenario, the existence of an opportunity to extract concessions, or at least be on the regime payroll, diminishes incentives for the organized opposition to use violent means like terrorism. However, when there is no legislature and opposition political parties are active, the organized opposition lacks a venue to obtain concessions from the dictator. Under this scenario, the opposition has more incentives to use violent means like terrorism to obtain their political goals. We propose two ways in which transition from organized political parties to terrorism can take place. First, moderate members of the opposition can be radicalized since there is no opportunity to extract concessions within the regime structure. Second, political parties can be a cover for the activities of radicals who are willing to use violence.

9. Jennifer Gandhi, *Political Institutions under Dictatorship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Our analysis based on data on terrorist groups and terrorist attacks from the Global Terrorism Database provides a range of evidence to support our theory. Regimes with active opposition parties and no legislature are the most likely to experience the emergence of terrorist groups. Moreover, autocracies with this particular institutional arrangement are also the targets of a significantly higher number of terrorist attacks across time. The results suggest that, when opposition parties exist in dictatorships, giving parties access to an elected legislature diminishes the incentives to use terrorism.

Several further studies examined variation in terrorism across dictatorships.¹⁰ Wilson and Piazza develop a theory based on the idea that dictatorships can respond to political dissent with either repression or co-optation. They argue that dictatorships that largely employ repression against dissent are more likely to experience terrorism than dictatorships that employ a combination of repression and co-optation. Using autocratic regime-type classification put forth by Barbara Geddes as an indicator of the type of strategy dictatorships largely use, they find that single-party dictatorships tend to be better at using both repression and co-optation, thus they experience relatively little terrorism. Military autocracies, which overwhelmingly use repression to crush dissent, experience more terrorism.

In another recent piece, Conrad, Conrad and Young explain why some dictatorships

10. Matthew C. Wilson and James A. Piazza, "Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks" *American Journal of Political Science* (October 2013): 551–577; and Justin Conrad, Courtenay Conrad, and Joseph Young, "Tyrants and Terrorism: Why Some Autocrats are Terrorized While Others are Not," *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (September 2014): 539–549.

experience more terrorism than others with a theory based on audience costs. In dictatorships with high audience costs, domestic population has some ability to mobilize and hold the leader accountable for policy failures. Building on the idea that dictatorships differ from one another in terms of the degree to which they generate audience costs, they argue that dictatorships which generate higher audience costs experience as much terrorism as democracies and much more terrorism than dictatorships that generate lower audience costs. Institutional arrangements matter because they determine the extent to which a dictatorship generates high audience costs. Accordingly, the authors argue that single-party and military regimes generate high audience costs and experience high levels of terrorism, while personalist dictatorships generate low audience costs thus experience less terrorism.

Avenues for future research

Future work on the link between dictatorships and terrorism can be improved with a focus on several key areas. First, researchers should explore and resolve inconsistencies in existing findings regarding emergence of terrorism and terrorist attacks. Existing studies on authoritarian institutions and terrorism put forth alternative theories of why some dictatorships are more likely to experience terrorism, yet have some interesting contradictory findings. For example, the argument and finding that single party regimes experience less terrorism in Wilson and Piazza's work is contradicted by Conrad, Conrad and Young.

Another major topic, which has received little attention, is the effects of terrorist violence on dictators and their regimes. While a long list of scholars have

studied the impact of terrorism on voters' behavior, electoral outcomes, and government duration in democracies, we know relatively little about political consequences of terrorism in dictatorships.¹¹ Indeed, the only work that exists on this topic studies the influence of terrorism on military coups. There are many other potential political consequences of terrorism that future work should systematically study. For example, related to the previous discussion of the relationship between institutions and terrorism, the question arises as to whether or not terrorism creates incentives for dictators to change the institutional structure of the regimes they lead (e.g. closing a legislature or banning political parties)? Similarly, while there is some work on the connections between repression and terrorism in democracies we know very little about the connections between terrorism, repression and human rights abuses under dictatorships. Thus, another topic for future research is repression in authoritarian regimes and its effects on terrorism.

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11. For political consequences of terrorism in democracies see for example Arzu Kibris, "Funerals and Elections: The Effects of Terrorism on Voting Behavior in Turkey," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55 (April 2011): pp. 220–247; Claude Berrebi and Esteban Klor, "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate," *American Political Science Review* 102 (August 2008): 279–301; and Laron K. Williams, Michael T. Koch, and Jason M. Smith, "The Political Consequences of Terrorism: Terror Events, Casualties, and Government Duration," *International Studies Perspectives* 14 (August 2013). For influence of terrorism on coups in dictatorships see Deniz Aksoy, David B. Carter, and Joseph Wright, "Terrorism in Dictatorships," *Journal of Politics* 74 (July 2012): 810–826.

SECTION NEWS

V-Dem Dataset and Public Release

On January, 4th Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project released its first complete dataset. It is the largest and most comprehensive database on democracy of its kind, enabling a vast research agenda and nuanced descriptive analyses that are comparable across time and space. The V-Dem dataset includes five Democracy Indices (electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian), 34 indices of various components of democracy, and about 350 unique and disaggregated democracy indicators. It covers 173 countries from 1900 until today. For download and full documentation, go to the V-Dem website via: <https://v-dem.net/en/data/>.

The data is also available for online analysis at the V-Dem webpage. Sophisticated but intuitive and accessible online analysis tools allows scholars, students, media, NGOs, practitioners, and others who are not familiar with statistical software to nevertheless benefit from use of this nuanced, comparative, and historical data source.

Call for Nominations: 2016 Section Awards at APSA Annual Meeting:

The Comparative Democratization Section will present five awards for scholarly work at the 2016 APSA annual meeting in Philadelphia: the Linz Prize for Best Dissertation, and the Best Book, Best Article, Best Field Work, and Best Paper prizes. Members are strongly encouraged to submit nominations (including, for several awards, self-nominations) to the appropriate committees listed below. Please also forward this information to colleagues and graduate students. We ask you to note the eligibility criteria, deadlines for submissions, and materials that must accompany nominations; direct any queries to the committee chairs.

Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy

Given for the best dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy completed and

accepted in the two calendar years immediately prior to the APSA Annual Meeting where the award will be presented (2014 or 2015 for the 2016 Annual Meeting). The prize can be awarded to analyses of individual country cases as long as they are clearly cast in a comparative perspective. A hard copy of the dissertation, accompanied by a letter of support from a member of the dissertation committee, should be sent to each member of the prize selection committee.

Deadline: March 15, 2016

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Best Article Award

Single-authored or co-authored articles focusing directly on the subject of democratization and published in 2015 are eligible. Nominations and self-nominations are encouraged. Copies of the article should be sent by email to each of the committee members.

Deadline: March 15, 2016

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Best Book Award

Given for the best book in the field of Comparative Democratization published in 2015 (authored, co-authored or edited). Copies of the nominated book should be sent to each committee member in time to arrive by March 15, 2016. Books received after this deadline cannot be considered.

Deadline: March 15, 2016

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Best Field Work Award

This prize rewards dissertation students who conduct especially innovative and difficult fieldwork. Scholars who are currently writing their dissertations or who complete their dissertations in 2015 are eligible. Candidates must submit two chapters of their dissertation and a letter of nomination from the chair of their dissertation committee describing the field work. The material submitted must describe the field work in detail and should provide one or two key insights from the evidence collected in the field. The chapters may be sent electronically or in hard copy directly to each committee member.

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Best Paper Award

Given to the best paper on Comparative Democratization presented at the previous year's APSA Convention. Papers can be nominated by panel chairs or discussants. Self-submissions are also encouraged.

Deadline: March 15, 2016

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NEWS FROM MEMBERS

Claire L. Adida, assistant professor of political science, University of California-San Diego, published *Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies* (Harvard University Press, 2016) with David D. Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort. The book examines the integration of Muslims in French society, the rational and irrational threads of Islamophobia in Europe, and how to develop policies promoting religious diversity. Her book *Immigrant Exclusion and Insecurity in Africa: Coethnic Strangers* (Cambridge University Press, 2014) received an Honorable Mention by the African Conference Group's 2014 Best Book committee.

Kate Baldwin, assistant professor of political science, Yale University, published *The Paradox of Traditional Leaders in Democratic Africa* (Cambridge University Press, 2016). The book examines the effects of powerful hereditary chiefs on democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. In a counter-intuitive argument, the book shows that elected politicians can respond most effectively to rural constituents through institutions constructed and maintained by unelected traditional leaders who are not worried about electoral time horizons.

Michael Bernhard, Raymond and Miriam Ehrlich Eminent Scholar Chair in Political Science, University of Florida, published "The Moore Thesis: What's Left after 1989" in the August 2015 *Democratization*. The article reconsiders Barrington Moore's work on the historical emergence of democracy in the context of post-communist democratization. He and **Krzysztof Jasiewicz**, William P. Ames, Jr. Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, Washington and Lee University, also coedited the May 2015 *Eastern European Politics and Societies*, "Whither Eastern Europe? Changing Approaches and Perspectives on the Region in Political Science."

Michael Bratton, University Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University, released a paperback edition of *Power Politics in Zimbabwe* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2015). Recognized as a 2015 "Outstanding Academic Title" by *Choice* magazine of the American Library Association, the book analyzes Zimbabwe's failed power-sharing experience, examines the institutional origins of that arrangement, and explains its demise.

Archie Brown, Emeritus Professor of Politics, University of Oxford, received the 2015 Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEES) Distinguished Contributions to Slavic, East

European, and Eurasian Studies Award at their annual conference held in Philadelphia in November 2015.

He also published numerous chapters and articles including “Mikhail Gorbachev” in *Mental Maps in the Era of Détente and the End of the Cold War* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); “The End of the Soviet Union” in the Fall 2015 *Journal of Cold War Studies*; “The Scottish Question in British Politics” in *Resplendent Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain* (I.B. Tauris, 2015); and “Politieshkoie liderstvo i politycheskaya vlast” [Political Leadership and Political Power] in the January 2016 *Polis: politycheskie issledovaniya*.

David E. Dixon is now professor and chair of political science, California State University-Dominguez Hills. He coedited the second volume of *Rhetoric, Religion, and the Civil Rights Movement, 1954–1965* (Baylor University Press, 2014) with Davis W. Houck, which features fifty new speeches and sermons from famed leaders and little-known activists demonstrating the use of religious rhetoric to upset the racial status quo during the American civil rights era. The public access student research journal *Zarytheus*, of which he is managing editor, is now based at California State University-Dominguez Hills.

John P. Entelis, professor of political science, Fordham University, published “The Algerian Conundrum: Authoritarian State, Democratic Society” in January 2016 as a part of the *Prospects for Political Reform Post-Arab Spring* monograph series with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The article argues that, while Algerian civil society bristles with democratic aspirations, the Algerian state remains highly authoritarian under the control of an embedded military-industrial complex.

The African Politics Conference Group section of APSA recently named their

Distinguished Africanist Award for **John W. Harbeson**, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, The City College of New York, and professorial lecturer, Johns Hopkins University and George Washington University. He is also the first recipient of this award.

Jonathan Hartlyn, Kenneth J. Reckford Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Senior Associate Dean for Social Sciences and Global Programs, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, published “Normative and Empirical Perspectives on Constitutionalism and Presidentialism” in the Winter 2015 *Latin American Politics and Society*. The article is a review of four books published in 2013 regarding the relationship between constitutionalism and presidential rule in Latin America.

Juliet Johnson, professor of political science, McGill University, will publish *Priests of Prosperity: How Central Bankers Transformed the Postcommunist World* (Cornell University Press) in February 2016. The book explores the revolutionary campaign to transform postcommunist central banks into Western-style monetary guardians and the influence of a Western central banking network on their development.

Carl LeVan, assistant professor of international service, American University, published “Parallel Institutionalism and the Future of Representation in Nigeria” in the December 2015 *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. The article argues that a ‘parallel institutionalism’ has mediated Nigeria’s heterogeneity and sustained the 1914 unification of the Northern and Southern Nigeria protectorates.

Eduardo Moncada, assistant professor of political science, Columbia University, published *Cities, Business, and the Politics of Urban Violence in Latin America* (Stanford University Press, 2015). The book examines how urban political economies and patterns of urban violence shape municipal responses

to the challenge of urban violence in Latin America.

Olena Nikolayenko, associate professor of political science, Fordham University, organized the guest lecture “Ordinary Citizens in Extraordinary Times: Civil Society in Ukraine” featuring Yale World Fellow Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, a Ukrainian rock musician and civic activist. Held at Fordham University on November 20, 2015, the lecture is available for viewing at Fordham’s YouTube channel using the URL: <https://youtu.be/47IWTJXPnvc>.

Cheryl O’Brien, assistant professor of political science, San Diego State University, published “Transnational Issue-Specific Expert Networking: A Pathway to Local Policy Change” in the December 2015 *Social Science & Medicine*. The article analyzes the implications of issue-specific networking on subnational policies to combat violence against women.

After nearly 30 years as Vice President of Research and Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy, **Marc F. Plattner** has stepped down from this position to focus on continuing to serve as editor of the *Journal of Democracy*. **Christopher Walker** has been appointed to take over as Vice President for Research and Studies at the Endowment.

Bo Rothstein is now professor of government and public policy at the University of Oxford. He copublished “Making Development Work: The Quality of Government Approaches” with Marcus Tannenberg in December 2015 policy report for the Swedish government’s Expert Group for Aid Studies. He also published an article with Eric M. Uslaner entitled “The Historical Roots of Corruption: State Building, Economic Inequality, and Mass Education” in the January 2016 *Comparative Politics*.

Section News/New Research

Sanjay Ruparelia, associate professor of politics, The New School, published *Divided We Govern: Coalition Politics in Modern India* (Oxford University Press, 2015). The book examines the rise, performance, and decline of the broader parliamentary left and wider dynamics of national coalition governments in modern Indian democracy.

Andreas Schedler, professor of political science, Center for Economic Teaching and Research (CIDE), published “Communicating Authoritarian Elite Cohesion” in the January 2016 *Democratization* with Bert Hoffman. The article develops a theoretical framework to analyze the communicative imperatives authoritarian regimes face as a consequence of their self-inflicted opacities.

Dr. Schedler also published “A Subversão Criminal da Democracia Mexicana” in the October 2015 *Journal of Democracy em Português* and *En la Niebla de la Guerra: Los Ciudadanos ante la Violencia Criminal Organizada [In the Fog of War: Citizens and Organized Criminal Violence in Mexico]* (CIDE, 2015).

Jan Teorell, professor of political science, Lund University, will copublish “Measuring High Level Democratic Principles using the V-Dem Data” in the forthcoming *International Political Science Review* with **Michael Coppedge**, professor of political science, University of Notre Dame, **Staffan Lindberg**, professor of political science, University of Gothenburg, and **Svend-Erik Skaaning**, professor of political science, Aarhus University. The article presents new measures of polyarchy, liberal democracy, deliberative democracy, egalitarian democracy, and participatory democracy that cover most polities between 1900 and 2013 and how these measures reflect variations in quality of democracy.

Michael Wahman, assistant professor of political science, University of Missouri,

coedited *The Malawi 2014 Tripartite Elections: Is Democracy Maturing?* (National Initiative for Civic Education, 2015) with Nandini Patel. The book explores the different aspects of the recent election and studies the process of democratic consolidation in Malawi. He also published “Rural Bias in African Electoral Systems: Legacies of Unequal Representation in African Democracies” with Catherine Boone in the December 2015 *Electoral Studies*.

Jennifer Widner, professor of politics and international affairs, Princeton University, seeks partnerships with scholars for the Innovations for Successful Societies (ISS) program based at Princeton University. Aiming to research the building of institutional performance in new democracies, ISS has released new case studies on several questions germane to comparative democratization including norms and practices of governance and variations of civilian engagement. If interested in collaborating, please e-mail Jennifer Widner at jwidner@princeton.edu.

Matthew Wilson is now assistant professor of political science at West Virginia University. He and **Gretchen Casper**, associate professor of political science, Pennsylvania State University, coauthored “Using Sequences to Model Crises” in the May 2015 *Political Science Research and Methods*. The article explores the application of sequence analysis on the study of bargaining between actors during national crises and the robustness of a commonly used sequence analysis metric.

Ashutosh Varshney, Sol Goldman Professor of International Studies and the Social Sciences, Brown University, published “Asian Democracy through an Indian Prism” in the November 2015 *Journal of Asian Studies*. Varshney contributes this article concerning Indian democracy to a larger symposium on Asian democracy in a special issue of *The Journal of Asian Studies*.

Sean Yom, assistant professor of political science, Temple University, published *From Resilience to Revolution: How Foreign Interventions Destabilize the Middle East* (Columbia University Press, 2015). The book examines how past foreign interventions have influenced regimes to form or neglect broader coalitions in Iran, Jordan, and Kuwait. He also published “Understanding the Arab Spring: One Region, Several Puzzles, and Many Explanations” in the October 2015 *Government and Opposition*.

NEW RESEARCH

Journal of Democracy

The January 2016 (Vol. 27, no. 1) *Journal of Democracy* features clusters of articles on “What’s Wrong with East-Central Europe?” “The Authoritarian Threat,” “Ethiopia,” and “The Quest for Good Governance,” as well as individual articles on China and Sri Lanka.

“On Democratic Backsliding” by Nancy Bermeo

Old-fashioned military coups and blatant election-day fraud are becoming mercifully rarer these days, but other, subtler forms of democratic regression are a growing problem that demands attention.

What’s Wrong with East-Central Europe?

I. “The Fading Mirage of the ‘Liberal Consensus’” by James Dawson and Sean Hanley

Across East-Central Europe, the political center ground has long been characterized by the uneasy cohabitation of liberal and illiberal norms, but the latter have been gradually overpowering the former.

II. “Liberalism’s Failure to Deliver” by Ivan Krastev

Is democracy in East-Central Europe suffering because of a lack of liberal zeal among elites, as

Dawson and Hanley contend, or is it because liberal policies have failed to deliver to their promises?

“China and the ‘Singapore Model’” by Stephan Ortmann and Mark R. Thompson
China’s government looks to Singapore, the only country in the region to modernize without liberalizing, in hopes of finding the key to combining authoritarian rule with economic progress and “good governance.”

The Authoritarian Threat

I. “The Hijacking of ‘Soft Power’” by Christopher Walker

Although the leading authoritarian regimes are today integrated in many ways into the global system, they have not become more like the democracies; instead, they have been devising policies and practices aimed at blocking democracy’s advance.

II. “Weaknesses of Autocracy Promotion” by Lucan Way

While “autocracy promotion” presents a real danger, its influence so far has been limited. Because authoritarian regimes are concerned first with furthering their own interests, their interventions often have contradictory effects, sometimes even inadvertently fostering greater pluralism.

Ethiopia

I. “The 100% Election” by Leonardo R. Arriola and Terrence Lyons

The ruling EPRDF and its allies won every single seat in parliament in Ethiopia’s May 2015 elections, signaling a hardening of the regime’s authoritarian rule.

II. “Silencing Dissent” by Simegnish Yekoye Mengesha

Ethiopia’s ruling party has long been tightening its grip, using antiterrorism laws and harsh restrictions on media and civil society to silence voices critical of the regimes.

The Quest for Good Governance

I. “Learning from Virtuous Circles” by Alina

Mungiu-Pippidi

Are the “virtuous circles” crucial to good governance always the product of long-term developments under unique historical circumstances, or can they be started or accelerated by wise policies?

II. “Georgia’s Break with the Past” by Alexander Kupatadze

Much can be done to uproot graft when a major event such as the Rose Revolution sweeps in a determined new team on a wave of massive public support.

III. “Taiwan’s Fight Against Corruption” by Christian Goebel

Bold leadership from people in key posts can effectively promote public integrity, but they must be ready to accept tenures that are stormy and short.

IV. “Uruguay’s Shift from Clientelism” by Daniel Buquet and Rafael Pineiro

A change in the shape of partisan competition, and the traditional parties’ ability to adapt to it, has led to the decline of once-pervasive clientelism.

“A Win for Democracy in Sri Lanka” by Neil DeVotta

The surprising electoral defeat of President Mahinda Rajapaksa in January 2015 was reinforced by his failed comeback in August parliamentary elections.

Democratization (Volume 23, no. 1, 2016)

“What Is Democracy? A

Reconceptualization of the Quality of Democracy” by Gerardo L. Munck

“Are Lions Democrats? The Impact of Democratization on Economic Growth in Africa, 1980-2010” by Giovanni Marco Carbone, Vincenzo Memoli, and Lia Quartapelle

“Three Waves of Semi-Presidential Studies” by Robert Elgie

“Why Some Countries Are Immune from the Resource Curse: The Role of Economic Norms” by S. Erdem Aytac, Michael Mousseau, and Omer Faruk Orsun
“Communication Authoritarian Elite Cohesion” by Andreas Schedler and Bert Hoffmann

“The Moore Thesis: What’s Left after 1989?” by Michael Bernhard

“The Problem with Autocracy Promotion” by Oisín Tansey

“Is Democracy about Redistribution?” by Carl Henrik Knutsen and Simone Wegmann

Democratization (Volume 22, no. 7, 2015)

“Utilitarian and Modern: Clientelism, Citizen Empowerment, and Civic Engagement in the Arab World” by Sabri Ciftci and Ethan M. Bernik

“Why Do Some Arab Citizens See Democracy as Unsuitable for their Country?” by Lindsay J. Benstead

“The Primacy of Political Security: Contentious Politics and Insecurity in the Tunisian Revolution” by Thomas O’Brien

“Perceived Human Rights and Support for New Democracies: Lessons from Mexico” by Courtney Hillebrecht, Dona-Gene Mitchell, and Sergio C. Wals

“Democracy Assistance and Women’s Political Empowerment in Post-Conflict Countries” by Paulina Pospieszna

“Democracy, Autocracy, and the News: The Impact of Regime Type on Media Freedom” by Sebastian Stier

“Translating Membership into Power at the Ballot Box? Trade Union Candidates

New Research

and Worker Voting Patterns in Indonesia's National Elections" by Teri L. Caraway, Michele Ford, and Hari Nugroho

"Illiberal Democracy and Violent Conflict in Contemporary Indonesia" by Chris Wilson

"In the Name of King, Country, and People on the Westminster Model and Bhutan's Constitutional Transition" by Winnie Bothe

SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES ON DEMOCRACY

African Affairs, Vol. 114, no. 457, October 2015

"Elites and Democracy in Ghana: A Social Network Approach" by Anja Osei

"Autocratic Legacies and State Management of Islamic Activism in Niger" by Sebastian Elischer

"The 2012 Crisis in Mali: Ongoing Empirical State Failure" by Jaimie Bleck and Kristin Michelitch

"Burundi's Electoral Crisis – Back to Power-Sharing Politics as Usual?" by Stef Vandeginste

"The Struggle over Truth – Rwanda and the BBC" by Filip Reyntjens

American Political Science Review, Vol. 109, no. 4, November 2015

"Is Democratic Leadership Possible?" by Eric Beerbohm

"Feminisms, Women's Rights, and the UN: Would Achieving Gender Equality Empower Women?" by Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat

"Why Are Immigrants Underrepresented in Politics? Evidence from Sweden" by Rafaela M. Dancygier, Karl-Oskar Lindgren, Sven Oskarsson, and Kare Vernby

Social Samaritan Justice: When and Why Needy Fellow Citizens Have a Right to Assistance" by Laura Valentini
"Rationalism in Politics" by Peter J. Steinberger

"Transparency, Protest, and Autocratic Instability" by James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland

Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 48, no. 4, December 2015

"Slovenia in Crisis: A Tale of Unfinished Democratization in East-Central Europe" by Bojan Bugarcic and Alenka Kuhelj

"Between Democracy and Putsch? – Censure Motions in Romania (1989–2012)" by Lavinia Stan

"Explanation of Spatial Differentiation of Electoral Results in the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic" by Petr Voda and Michal Pink

"Perceptions of Civil Rights, Security and the 'War on Terror': East and West Compared" by Åse B. Grødeland

"Determinants of the Labour Market Institutions in Post-Socialist Economies" by Michał Pilec

"Germans 25 Years after Reunification – How Much Do They Know about the German Democratic Republic and What Is Their Value Judgment of the Socialist Regime?" by Daniel Stockemer and Greg Elder

"Russian Influence on News Media in Belarus" by Joanna Szostek

"Converging Party Systems in Russia and Central Asia: A Case of Authoritarian Norm Diffusion?" by Sean P. Roberts

"Back to the Future?" Cuban–Russian Relations under Raúl Castro" by Mervyn J. Bain

Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 48, no. 2-3, June–September 2015

"Challenges and Promises of Comparative Research into post-Soviet Fascism: Methodological and Conceptual Issues in the Study of the Contemporary East European Extreme Right" by Andreas Umland

"Fascism or Ustashism? Ukrainian Integral Nationalism of the 1920s–1930s in Comparative Perspective" by Oleksandr Zaitsev

"Elusive Proteus: A Study in the Ideological Morphology of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" by Ivan Gomza

"National Democracy, the OUN, and Dontsovism: Three Ideological Currents in Ukrainian Nationalism of the 1930s–40s and their Shared Myth-System" by Myroslav Shkandrij

"Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics and Perceptions of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine" by Ivan Katchanovski

"Voting, Identity and Security Threats in Ukraine: Who Supports the 'Radical Freedom' Party?" by Lenka Bustikova

"The 'Right Sector' and Others: The Behavior and Role of Radical Nationalists in the Ukrainian Political Crisis of Late 2013 – Early 2014" by Vyacheslav Likhachev

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 49, no. 1, January 2016

"Partisan Cues and Vote Choice in New Multiparty Systems" by Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz, Devra C. Moehler, and Rosario Aguilar

“Silencing Critics: Why and How Presidents Restrict Media Freedom in Democracies” by Marisa Kellam and Elizabeth A. Stein

***Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 48, no. 14, December 2015**

“Power and Institutional Change: Re-Reforms of Latin American Pension Systems in a Comparative Perspective” by Kaori Baba

“Political Parties, Clientelism, and Bureaucratic Reform” by Cesi Cruz and Philip Keefer

“The Non-Democratic Origins of Income Taxation” by Isabela Mares and Didac Queralt

***Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 48, no. 13, November 2015**

“The Role of Subnational Politicians in Distributive Politics: Political Bias in Venezuela’s Land Reform Under Chávez” by Michael Albertus

“Party Nomination Rules and Campaign Participation” by Georgia Kernell

***Comparative Politics*, Vol. 48, no. 2, January 2016**

“When Autocratic Regimes Are Cheap and Play Dirty: The Transaction Costs of Repression in South Africa, Kenya, and Egypt” by Jens Rudbeck, Erica Mukherjee, and Kelly Nelson

“The Importance of Winning: Victorious Insurgent Groups and Authoritarian Politics” by Terrence Lyons

“Mandate and the Market: Policy Outcomes under the Left in Latin America” by Glen Biglaiser

“The Merits of Problem-Solving over Powering: Governance Reforms in Brazil and Argentina” by Katherine Bersch

“The Historical Roots of Corruption: State Building, Economic Inequality, and Mass Education” by Eric M. Uslaner and Bo Rothstein

“Splitting the Difference? The Politics of District Creation in Indonesia” by Jan H. Pierskalla

***East European Politics*, Vol. 31, no. 4, 2015**

“Losing Control: a Principal-Agent Analysis of Russia in the United Nations Security Council’s Decision-Making towards the Libya Crisis” by Yf Reykers & Niels Smeets

“Neither Security nor Development? Czech and Hungarian Identities and Interests in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan” by Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň and Balázs Szent-Iványi

“Beyond Instrumentalisation: NGO Monitoring Coalitions in Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia” by Natasha Wunsch

“Who Commits to the Rule of Law? Constrained Government and Foreign Direct Investment in Postcommunist States” by Michael Touchton

***Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 37, no. 4, November 2013**

“The Right to Food Under Hugo Chávez” by Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann

***International Political Science Review*, Vol. 37, no. 1, January 2016**

“Institutional, Societal, and Economic Determinants of Party System Size: Evidence from Brazil” by Simone Bohn

“Trust in Government Institutions: The Effects of Performance and Participation in the Dominican Republic and Haiti” by Alissandra T Stoyan, Sara Niedzwiecki, Jana Morgan, Jonathan Hartlyn, and Rosario Espinal

“Competitive Authoritarianism and Popular Protest: Evidence from Serbia under Milošević” by Nebojša Vladislavljević

***International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 59, no 4, December 2015**

“When Do Dictators Decide to Liberalize Trade Regimes? Inequality and Trade Openness in Authoritarian Countries” by Wen-Chin Wu

“Dictators and Death: Casualty Sensitivity of Autocracies in Militarized Interstate Disputes” by Cigdem V. Sirin and Michael T. Koch

“Stasis or Decay? Reconciling Covert War and the Democratic Peace” by Michael Poznansky

***Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 53, no. 4, December 2015**

“Grievances, Governance and Islamist Violence in sub-Saharan Africa” by Caitriona Dowd

“(Dis)unity in Diversity: How Common Beliefs about Ethnicity Benefit the White Mauritian Elite” by Tijo Salverda

“Does Democratisation Foster Effective Taxation? Evidence from Benin” by Giulia Piccolino

“Mundele, it is because of you’ History, Identity and the Meaning of Democracy in the Congo” by Meike J. De Goede

***Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 57, no. 4, Winter 2015**

“What Determines Foreign Policy in Latin America? Systemic versus Domestic Factors in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, 1946–2008” by Octavio Amorim Neto and Andrés Malamud

“The Co-optation of LGBT Movements in Mexico and Nicaragua: Modernizing Clientelism?” by Marcus J. McGee and Karen Kampwirth

New Research

Middle East Journal, Vol. 69, no 4, Fall 2015

“The Emergence of Ex-Jihadi Political Parties in Post-Mubarak Egypt” by Jérôme Drevon

“Upended Path: The Rise and Fall of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood” by Khalil al-Anani

“Politicized Identities, Securitized Politics: Sunni-Shi’a Politics in Egypt” by Alam Saleh and Hendrik Kraetzschmar

“Islamic Women’s Groups and the Quest for Political Representation in Turkey and Iran” by Mona Tajali

Party Politics, Vol. 22, no. 1, January 2016

“How Democracy Functions without Parties: The Republic of Palau” by Wouter P Veenendaal

“The Validity of the RILE Left–Right Index as a Measure of Party Policy” by Martin Mölder

“Democratic Dynasties? Internal Party Democracy in Bangladesh” by Inge Amundsen

Representation, Vol. 51, no. 3, 2015

“Electoral Systems and Opinion Representation” by Christopher Wlezien and Stuart N. Soroka

“Research Note: The Influence of Party Candidate Selection Methods on Candidate Diversity” by Anika Gauja and William Cross

“Electoral Dioramas: On the Problem of Representation in Voting Advice Applications” by Thomas Fossen and Bert van den Brink

SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON DEMOCRACY

ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES

American Justice 2015: The Dramatic Tenth Term of the Roberts Court. By Steven V. Mazie. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015. 167 pp.

American Pendulum: Recurring Debates in U.S. Grand Strategy. By Christopher Hemmer. Cornell University Press, 2015. 224 pp.

The American President: From Teddy Roosevelt to Bill Clinton. By William E. Leuchtenburg. Oxford University Press, 2015. 886 pp.

Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism. By John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart. Oxford University Press, 2016. 391 pp.

Language Assistance under the Voting Rights Act: Are Voters Lost in Translation? By Shauna Reilly. Lexington, 2015. 131 pp.

Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics, 2nd ed. By James A. Stimson. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 173 pp.

What Would Madison Do? The Father of the Constitution Meets Modern American Politics. Edited by Benjamin Wittes and Pietro Nivola. Brookings Institution Press, 2015. 240 pp.

Youth Participation in Democratic Life: Stories of Hope and Disillusion. By Bart Cammaerts et al. Palgrave Macmillian, 2016. 237 pp.

AFRICA

African Institutions: Challenges to Political, Social, and Economic Foundations of Africa’s Development. By Ali A. Mazrui and Francis Wiafe-Amoako. Rowman and Littlefield, 2016. 184 pp.

Making Freedom: Apartheid, Squatter Politics, and the Struggle for Home. By Anne-Maria Makhulu. Duke University Press, 2015. 228 pp.

ASIA

Anti-Americanism in Democratizing South Korea. By David Straub. Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2015. 246 pp.

Divided We Govern: Coalition Politics in Modern India. By Sanjay Ruparelia. Oxford University Press, 2015. 480 pp.

India: Democracy and Violence. Edited by Samir Kumar Das. Oxford University Press, 2015. 258 pp.

Metamorphosis: Studies in Social and Political Change in Myanmar. Edited by Renaud Egretteau and François Robinne. NUS Press, 2016. 428 pp.

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

The Policy-Making Process and Social Learning in Russia: The Case of Housing Policy. By Marina Khmel'nitskaya. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 279 pp.

Politics and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet Eurasia. Edited by Martin Brusis. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 251 pp.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Barrio Rising: Urban Popular Politics and the Making of Modern Venezuela. By Alejandro Velasco. University of California Press, 2015. 321 pp.

The Organization of American States as the Advocate and Guardian of Democracy: An Insider’s Critical Assessment of Its Role in Promoting and Defending Democracy. By Rubén M. Perina. University Press of America, 2015. 257 pp.

The Politics of Local Participatory Democracy in Latin America: Institutions, Actors, and Interactions. By Françoise Montambeault. Stanford University Press, 2015. 265 pp.

MIDDLE EAST

EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring: International Cooperation and Authoritarianism. By Vera Van Hüllen. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 242 pp.

The Sunni Tragedy in the Middle East: Northern Lebanon from al-Qaeda to ISIS. By Bernard Rougier. Princeton University Press, 2015. 259 pp.

Workers and Thieves: Labor Movements and Popular Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. By Joel Beinin. Stanford University Press, 2016. 164 pp.

COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL, GENERAL

The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy. By Daniel A. Bell. Princeton University Press, 2015. 336 pp.

Democracy, Culture, Catholicism: Voices from Four Continents. Edited by Michael Schuck and John Crowley-Buck. Fordham University Press. 350 pp.

Democratic Equilibrium: The Supply and Demand of Democracy. By Michael W. Fowler. Lexington, 2015. 219 pp.

Do International Corruption Metrics Matter? The Impact of Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. By Omar E. Hawthorne. Lexington Books, 2015. 159 pp.

The Economics of Immigration: Market-Based Approaches, Social Science, and Public Policy. Edited by Benjamin Powell. Oxford University Press, 2015. 249 pp.

The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. By Angus Deaton. Princeton University Press, 2013. 360 pp.

La revanche des passions: Métamorphoses de la violence et crises du politique. By Pierre Hassner. Fayard, 2015. 360 pp.

Media and Politics in New Democracies: Europe in a Comparative Perspective. Edited by Jan Zielonka. Oxford University Press, 2015. 322 pp.

The Midas Paradox: Financial Markets, Government Policy Shocks, and the Great Depression. By Scott Sumner. Independent Institute, 2016. 509 pp.

Pivotal Countries, Alternate Futures: Using Scenarios to Manage American Strategy.

By Michael F. Oppenheimer. Oxford University Press, 2016. 260 pp.

Political Turbulence: How Social Media Shape Collective Action. By Helen Margetts et al. Princeton University Press, 2015. 279 pp.

The Politics of Majority Nationalism: Framing Peace, Stalemates, and Crises. By Neophytos Loizides. Stanford University Press, 2015. 242 pp.

The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy. By Richard Youngs. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015. 215 pp.

The Rise of Democracy: Revolution, War and Transformations in International Politics Since 1776. By Christopher Hobson. Edinburgh University Press, 2015. 254 pp.

The Shape of the New: Four Big Ideas and How They Made the Modern World. By Scott L. Montgomery and Daniel Chirot. Princeton University Press, 2015. 492 pp.

Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice. By Peter Jones. Stanford University Press, 2015. 237 pp.

Uninformed: Why People Know So Little About Politics and What We Can Do About It. By Arthur Lupia. Oxford University Press, 2016. 434 pp.

APSA-CD

is the official newsletter of the American Political Science Association's Comparative Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published three times a year (October, January, and May) by the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and expanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the field. The newsletter is now jointly produced and edited by faculty members of the V-Dem Institute and the International Forum.

Executive Editor



Staffan I. Lindberg is professor of political science and director of the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg; is one of four PIs for Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem); Wallenberg Academy Fellow; selected member Young Academy of Sweden; and a Research Fellow in the QoG Institute. He is author of *Democracy and Elections in Africa* and editor of *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition?*, and has also worked on women's representation, clientelism, voting behavior, party and electoral systems, democratization, popular attitudes, and the Ghanaian legislature and executive-legislative relationships.

Members



Anna Lührmann is a post-doctoral fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. Her doctoral thesis – completed in summer 2015 at Humboldt University (Berlin) – studies the causes and effects of United Nation's electoral assistance. She currently works on several research projects concerning electoral manipulation, regime legitimacy and the impact of democracy promotion.



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Kelly M. McMann is an associate professor of political science at Case Western Reserve University and the V-Dem project manager for subnational government. She currently is conducting research on how democracy develops within countries, studying contemporary cases in Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union and historical cases in Europe. Her earlier research focused on corruption and activism and has been published in the books *Corruption as a Last Resort: Adapting to the Market in Central Asia* and *Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan*.



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